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# ***Daily Report***

# **Sub-Saharan Africa**

FBIS-AFR-90-221  
Thursday  
15 November 1990

# Daily Report

## Sub-Saharan Africa

FBIS-AFR-90-221

### CONTENTS

15 November 1990

NOTICE TO READERS: An \* indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

#### INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS

- \* Trans-African Railroad Project Envisaged [Johannesburg ENGINEERING NEWS 12 Oct] ..... 1

#### CENTRAL AFRICA

##### Chad

- Army High Command Issues Further Communique [Ndamena Radio] ..... 3

##### Gabon

- Bongo on Role of Opposition in Government [Libreville Africa No. 1] ..... 3

##### Rwanda

- Habyarimana Addresses Legislators on Reform [Kigali Radio] ..... 3
- Minister Geens Meets Foreign Minister, Others [Kigali Radio] ..... 5

##### Zaire

- President Mobutu Receives Patriotic Front [AZAP] ..... 5
- Rwandan Rebel Delegation Arrives for Talks [Kigali Radio] ..... 6
- Habre Sends Message to Mobutu, Expects Aid [Kinshasa Radio] ..... 6

#### EAST AFRICA

##### Uganda

- Rwandans Said Attacked by Gunmen at Border [AFP] ..... 7
- \* 'Minor' Recovery Threatened by Oil Price Rise [London AFRICA ANALYSIS 28 Sep] ..... 7
- \* Leaders Seen Balanced Among Clans, Interests [London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL 28 Sep] ..... 7

#### REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

- No Place for ANC's MK in Defense Force [SAPA] ..... 11
- Ministers Issue 'Strongly-Worded' Statements [Johannesburg TV] ..... 11
- Deputy Minister on Criteria for New Constitution [Johannesburg International] ..... 11
- SACP Denies Agreement Made on Arms Surrender [SAPA] ..... 12
- ANC Examines Land Ownership, Property Rights [SAPA] ..... 13
- 'Property of all the People' [SAPA] ..... 14
- 'Progressive Land Tax' [SAPA] ..... 14
- Ownership, Labor Legislation [SAPA] ..... 15
- 'Advantages', 'Disadvantages' [SAPA] ..... 15
- PAC, Azapo Members on Negotiations Opposition [Johannesburg International] ..... 16
- Battle of Ideological Differences in PAC Viewed [SOUTH 8-14 Nov] ..... 17
- NP Constitution Blueprint 'Classic' U.S.-Style [SOUTH 8-14 Nov] ..... 19
- CSS Report Notes 2.1 Percent Decline in GDP [SAPA] ..... 19
- Production Price Index Rises Sharply in Sep [Johannesburg Radio] ..... 19
- Press Reviews on Current Problems, Issues ..... 20
- 14 November [THE STAR 14 Nov, etc.] ..... 20
- 15 November [THE STAR 15 Nov, etc.] ..... 20

- \* Formulation of Land Reform Policy Viewed [FINANCIAL MAIL 12 Oct] ..... 21
- \* ANC Membership Configuration Changing [WORK IN PROGRESS Sep] ..... 23

## SOUTHERN AFRICA

### Angola

- Diplomat Says Cuba Will Continue Assistance [Luanda Radio] ..... 25
- Commentary Stresses Need for 'Reconstruction' [KUP] ..... 25
- \* First Shipment of Gasohol Arrives in Namibia [JORNAL DE ANGOLA 20 Sep] ..... 25
- \* Friendship Association Formed With France [JORNAL DE ANGOLA 15 Sep] ..... 26
- \* Businesses Discuss Cooperation in Lisbon [JORNAL DE ANGOLA 20 Sep] ..... 26
- \* Religious Groups Allowed in Education [JORNAL DE ANGOLA 14 Sep] ..... 27
- \* Closing of Some Unofficial Markets Announced ..... 27
  - \* Official Lists Names [JORNAL DE ANGOLA 7 Sep] ..... 27
  - \* Decision Challenged [JORNAL DA ANGOLA 18 Sep] ..... 27
- \* Sonangol's Performance Discussed [JORNAL DE ANGOLA 18 Sep] ..... 28
- \* Catumbela To Be 'Alternate' Airport [JORNAL DE ANGOLA 7 Sep] ..... 30

### Lesotho

- Lekhanya Pledges Support for New Monarch [Maseru Radio] ..... 30
- King Moshoeshoe II Speaks on Military Council [SAPA] ..... 31

### Mauritius

- \* Trade Relations With Germany Discussed [LE MILITANT MAGAZINE 13-14 Oct] ..... 31

### Mozambique

- Chissano Swears in Newly Appointed Officials [Maputo Radio] ..... 33
- Delegates Criticize Union, Cost of Living, State [Maputo International] ..... 34
- Finance Minister Announces Credit 'Restraint' [Maputo Radio] ..... 35
- Trade Minister Comments on PTA Upon Departure [Maputo Radio] ..... 35

### Namibia

- Nujoma Announces Measures To Protect Waters [Johannesburg Radio] ..... 35
- Lifting of U.S. Sanctions Against Nation Urged [Umtata Radio] ..... 35

### Swaziland

- Police, Army Beat Boycotting University Students [THE TIMES OF SWAZILAND 15 Nov] ..... 35

### Zambia

- Choma Court Adjourns Opposition Trial [London International] ..... 36

## WEST AFRICA

### Ghana

- Regional Fora on Democracy End; Results Viewed [Accra Radio] ..... 37
- Secretary Launches ECOWAS Travel Documents [PANAF] ..... 37

### Guinea

- President Urges Expatriates To Return Home [Libreville Africa No 1] ..... 37
- Conte Leaves for Cuba [AFP] ..... 38

**Ivory Coast**

Paper Comments on PDCI Succession Strategy	[LE NOUVEL HORIZON 12 Nov]	38
Gbagbo's Letter Addresses Citizens on Elections	[LE NOUVEL HORIZON 12 Nov]	38

**Liberia**

NPFL Claims Nigerian Planes Bomb Buchanan	[London International]	39
ECOWAS Role After Abortive Summit Viewed	[Paris VOIX D'AFRIQUE Nov]	40

**Niger**

Army Contingent Leaves for Saudi Arabia	[Niamey Radio]	40
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
**Nigeria**

Sawyer Briefs Babangida; Liberian Station Noted	[Lagos Radio]	41
'Palestinian Ambassador' Condemns U.S. in Gulf	[PANA]	41
* Six-Month Debt Service Exceeds \$4 Billion	[NEW NIGERIAN 12 Oct]	42
* Officials Waive Voting Rights in Elections	[NEW NIGERIAN 16 Oct]	42

**Senegal**

Security Forces Arrest Opposition Leaders	[AFP]	43
* Editorial Reaction to Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait		43
* Iraq, U.S. Condemned	[SUD HEBDO 20 Sep]	43
* Military, Oil Groups Benefit	[WAL FADJRI 21-27 Sep]	43
* 2,000 Volunteers	[LE SOLEIL 11 Sep]	44





# \* Trans-African Railroad Project Envisaged

91AF0166A Johannesburg *ENGINEERING NEWS*  
in English 12 Oct 90 p 5

[Article by Liesl Weber]

[Text] The suggested multi-billion rand trans African railroad concessions 'belt' (Tarc) could become more than just a vision. (THE ENGINEERING NEWS 22 June)

Financial backing for the ambitious project has been placed in trust by entrepreneurs on three continents—ie, Europe, Asia and North America.

The backers are from France, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Florida, Singapore and Hong Kong.

However, they are not prepared to release funds before there is stability across the entire region to be transversed by the belt.

"These entrepreneurs are primarily interested in the bountiful natural resources available in southern Africa," says Francois Roux, a member of Tarcbelt International, acting for CMCI, the working arm of the proposed consortium now talking to IOM (International Organisation for Migration), a division of the United Nations.

The belt, which will slice through the southern part of Africa, and run from Namibia through Botswana and Zimbabwe ending in Mozambique, is a rail/road strip that will stimulate growth and prosperity in a region that is rich in numerous dormant resources.

The line will transverse about 2,500 km of land and its corridor width will fluctuate, but nowhere will it be narrower than four kilometres.

"Tarc will open up a very rich but largely undeveloped part of southern Africa," says Roux.

Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique stand to benefit most from this link.

CMCI is working in close collaboration with Kindinger International, transportation experts who have been pushing the tarc concept since January this year.

According to Jos Kindinger, head of the firm, the proposed belt—culminating in a new harbour at Cape Frio—will make Namibia less dependant upon Walvis Bay.

Landlocked Botswana can have alternate outlets to both the Atlantic and Indian Ocean, and the need for skilled workers to accommodate its growth can be satisfied.

Zimbabwe, which can also have access to both oceans, can supply most of the steel and cement for the belt.

The problem lies in Mozambique where the civil war between Frelimo [Mozambique Liberation Front] and Renamo [Mozambique National Resistance] inhibits the establishment of the belt.

Renamo has been concentrating mainly on the disruption of power, communication and the dismantlement of Mozambique's main transportation arteries.

Roux tells THE ENGINEERING NEWS that it is common knowledge among those who are in frequent

contact with the Renamo leader, **Afonso Dhlakama**, that he desires stability in his country.

"However, he does not want to negotiate a peace agreement for his people that will not, at the same time, eliminate the country's crippling foreign debt," reports Roux.

"Under the auspices of the IOM and other bodies affiliated to the UN, CMCI is prepared to talk to both Frelimo and Renamo and present the encompassing Tarcbelt suggestion to them.

"We propose that CMCI, under the auspices of the UN, should sign a composite 20-year charter with Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia and if all are agreeable then we will pursue negotiations with the South African authorities and also secure the 700 m<sup>2</sup> between Venda and the Limpopo for the Tarcbelt."

The charter will include: in return for a 20-year lease on an enclave encompassing the future Port Mocovane and its modern infrastructure, plus a corridor through which the proposed railway and road links from the Zimbabwean border will be running, CMCI will assume responsibility for the interest payments and the ultimate elimination of the foreign debt of Mozambique; CMCI shall be indemnified from making further payments to Mozambique or its creditors; the charter will empower

CMCI to build the proposed rail/road links plus Port Macovane and the cost will be borne by CMCI; upon expiry of the charter, all improvements effected by CMCI and its associates in the charter territory will become the property of Mozambique; the charter will entitle CMCI to collaborate with IOM, whereby residence permits can be granted to suitably qualified international temporary migrants to settle and work in the area; when the charter expires, temporary migrants shall attain ownership of the permanent improvements they had made on the land they had occupied; the charter shall entitle CMCI, affiliates and its associates to secure the services of suitably skilled persons from anywhere in the world to work in the charter territory.

With variations, similar charters will be signed with Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia.

CMCI, holding all four charters, will develop the entire Tarc Belt and, to speed up construction of the trans-continental railroad, it will use an assortment of contractors simultaneously.

In collaboration with IOM, it will settle the international temporary migrants and see to their well-being, but with the clear understanding that, before the charter expires, the temporary migrant must apply to Mozambique for citizenship.

## Chad

### Army High Command Issues Further Communique

AB1411203690 Ndjamena Domestic Service in French  
1900 GMT 14 Nov 90

[“Communique No. 11” from Chadian National Armed Forces, FANT issued on 14 November 1990; place issued not given]

[Text] The existence of our nation is threatened, is not it? And the valiant Chadian National Armed Forces are fighting the enemy coming from the Darfur Region in Sudan, our neighbor. Communique No. 11 from the FANT High Command says that the town of Tine was attacked today by the Islamic Legion. Let us now listen to the communique:

[Begin recording] Communique No. 11 from the FANT High Command: Today, 14 November 1990, at 1145 [1045 GMT], the forces of aggression and invasion of the Islamic Legion attacked the Chadian town of Tine. Violent fighting is taking place. Faithful to their commitment to defend their sacred country against any threat, the great FANT fighters will mercilessly rout the swarm of mercenaries and stop their drive to destroy Chad. [end recording]

## Gabon

### Bongo on Role of Opposition in Government

AB141113090 Libreville Africa No. 1 in French  
1830 GMT 10 Nov 90

[Text] In Gabon, the Political Bureau of the Gabonese Democratic Party [PDG], the former single ruling party that won the majority during the recent legislative elections, met this morning. This meeting is part of recent moves to form the country's government. In his recent address to the nation, President Omar Bongo suggested the formation of a national union government whatever the results of the elections. The Gabonese head of state referred to this issue again this week during an interview with our counterparts of JEUNE AFRIQUE ECONOMIE and the Ivorian daily, FRATERNITE MATIN. Let us listen to President Omar Bongo:

[Begin Bongo recording] In my address to the nation I said that whatever party wins, we will be forced to form a national union government. I could have said a government of openness if I had known the party that would win the majority, but what we will do...[changes thought] I have not abandoned my idea; I feel that it is not because the PDG has won the majority that I must continue to govern the country alone. Now, what we will do as soon as the prime minister is appointed is to join hands with the various leaders of the opposition to form a government that will be a government of the people for the people. Everybody will then be expected to work and there will be no dilly-dallying. I know that there are some

people who will not accept this. This is quite logical. I am not putting pressure on anybody, but I am just making suggestions and proposals. And if the opposition parties accept this, they will enter into the government. [end recording]

Omar Bongo, who received the leaders of the opposition parties at the beginning of the week, said that the government has opened its doors to the opposition parties. It will be recalled that after these audiences, the parties of the United Front of the Opposition Parties and Associations, FUAPO, said it would be better for the PDG, which is in the majority, to form the government alone. So, how does President Omar Bongo judge the Gabonese opposition? Let us listen to the Gabonese head of state once more:

[Begin Bongo recording] At the beginning, we thought that the opposition was irresponsible, but it was too early to say so. Personally, I think that the Gabonese opposition—and this is my view—is a responsible opposition which has understood its role of the opposition, and we shall not always be at loggerheads or be in opposition. We will have to work. So this opposition, just like the majority party at the assembly, will be asked to make (?concrete) suggestions. In my view, therefore, the opposition is doing its work as the opposition. I respect the opposition and the opposition will respect—and I am sure it respects—the rules of democracy, namely the constitution and the laws and regulations governing our country. [end recording]

## Rwanda

### Habyarimana Addresses Legislators on Reform

EA1411132090 Kigali Domestic Service in French  
1358 GMT 13 Nov 90

[Address by President Juvenal Habyarimana to members of parliament at the National Development Council headquarters, Kigali—live]

[Excerpts] Ladies and gentlemen, members of the diplomatic and consular missions, members of parliament, fellow Rwandans, friends of Rwanda, I am particularly pleased to be here with you today and to have the opportunity to address you on the premises of our parliament, the National Development Council, the very legislative body of any respectable democracy. Fellow party activists, I preferred, today, to address the Rwandan people through their democratically elected representatives because the two main topics which I would like to touch on are related to the issue of the relaunching of our economy and to the strengthening of democracy in our country. [passage omitted]

I always saw the strengthening of democracy in our country as an intrinsic demand coming with the development of our society. I gave lengthy explanations on this issue during my speech on 5 July 1990. We have been preparing it for almost three years now. Political

readjustment was defined as a priority in the 15 January 1989 speech program. But, the political reforms which we had envisaged may, and must in my opinion, be considered as a stimulating element for the economic recovery as we conceive it. That is why I requested recently that the process of political reforms should be speeded up. It is also necessary to further encourage all the goodwill and noteworthy efforts that numerous Rwandans, and those living abroad in particular, would like to provide with a view to contributing to the political debate and to strengthening democracy. That is why it is appropriate to redefine the mandate given to the National Review Commission and to give it a clear and realistic time schedule for the implementation of the political reforms started.

As the adoption of the National Political Charter precedes the revision of the Constitution, it is advisable to separate the two things: to fix a specific time schedule for the preparation of the National Political Charter first, and to envisage the revision of the Constitution only after the adoption of the political charter.

Since the intermediary step of the process of political reforms started is the submission for approval by the Rwandan people of a draft National Political Charter determining the modifications to be brought to the current Rwandan Constitution, it is then essential that the various steps leading to this be defined and understood perfectly and be scheduled in a realistic manner.

Since the preparation of a National Political Charter must determine the modifications to be brought to the current Constitution, its working out is a priority matter. The National Review Commission must, therefore, concentrate its efforts on this and must speed up the national consultation for which it has a mandate in order to perceive all the dimensions of the political reforms, to perceive their entire scope.

This consultation and the debate resulting from it will allow the National Review Commission to finalize a draft National Political Charter which will be submitted to the Rwandan people for approval by referendum. The following time schedule is to be respected by the National Review Commission and by those who wish to send their reflections to it: The National Review Commission is to finish drawing up a working document before 30 December 1990 to constitute the basis of the national debate on the National Political Charter. The National Review Commission will close the national debate based on this document before 15 March 1991.

It will finalize the National Political Charter project on the basis of the reactions and proposals gathered during the national debate before 30 April 1991, the date on which the commission is to submit its report. The referendum on the National Political Charter must then take place before 15 June 1991. It is the adoption of the new National Political Charter by the Rwandan people

which will determine the principles and framework for the implementation of our country's future political parties and formations.

The adoption of the National Political Charter by the Rwandan people will lead to the revision of the current Rwandan Constitution in order to bring in fundamental modifications approved by the people. At the same time, it will be possible, if the need arises, to revise other parts of the Constitution. This may become necessary as things change with time. The revision of the Constitution will take place as soon as possible.

It is obvious that nothing prevents people from already thinking, even now, about the political parties and formations which they would like to create, if such should be the case. This is in order for them to be prepared and to think about the political programs they would like to submit to the people.

As I have already said, it is important, during steps leading to the referendum on the National Political Charter, for all dynamic forces both inside and outside our country to be allowed to express themselves and to contribute actively to the preparatory works. That is why, in order to avoid the slightest ambiguity concerning our willingness to make people take part in defining the new political landscape, I urgently invite any person wishing to take part in the requested process of political reforms—all Rwandans living inside or outside the country—to inform us about their way of thinking, their suggestions, their proposals. Nothing prevents them from doing so either individually or collectively, or already, within organized entities sharing the same objectives with the view, eventually, to forming political parties later.

The participation of Rwandans living abroad can be done in many ways so that their contributions can be a part of the process of political reforms. It is not my role to list here the numerous possibilities available for their participation in this vital debate: sending the National Review Commission draft national political charters, analysis of some specific aspects of the charter—this is an example among others. We would really like all those who have something constructive to propose to the Rwandan people to do so. They can count on the assistance of our embassies abroad in sending documents, or for other services these embassies can render.

Everybody is, of course, welcome in Rwanda. I personally promised to ensure all security and complete freedom of speech for all those who wish to come to Rwanda in order to explain their ideas in our media or before the National Review Commission. That is what I have for you, today, about political readjustment. [passage omitted]

At the present time, Rwanda places all its hopes in the regional conference which the Tanzanian president, our brother Ali Hassan Mwinyi, will convene very soon and



which will bring together the Zairian, Burundian, Kenyan, Ugandan, and Rwandan presidents as well as representatives of international organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], the OAU, and observers from friendly countries.

As another immediate measure, why should the group of Rwandan refugees in Uganda, which was to make a visit to our country during the first half of last October, not come as quickly as possible and carry out the mission it was due to under the auspices of the UNHCR? This would allow resumption of the work already under way for a long time which was so brutally interrupted. I reiterate my appeal to refugees of all tendencies to seize the offer being made by Rwanda to find a peaceful solution, a harmonious solution to this problem, in the interest of all, a solution derived from constructive dialogue. [passage omitted]

Ever since the Rwandan Armed Forces managed to drive out most of these attackers, the sifting commission has quickly stepped up efforts to study several thousand files containing evidence of guilt to be proved. The commission in one month interrogated over 3,000 people, of whom it decided to release 2,500. [Words indistinct] continues to [word indistinct] its work by examining the charges against those arrested and interrogating them with a view to deciding either to release them immediately or send them to court for further investigations. [passage omitted]

Finally, the war revealed that the enemy had been able to exploit some of our weaknesses in the field of (?security). That is why I have decided that the current identity cards must be replaced by new ones to ensure maximal security from all points of view and [words indistinct] perhaps [words indistinct]. I, therefore, urge the minister of interior and communal development to start preparing and printing the new identity cards, immediately. The introduction of the new identity cards for maximal security will facilitate at the same time the exclusion of mention of ethnicity and the introduction of what should be mentioned on a modernized identity card. [passage omitted]

#### **Minister Geens Meets Foreign Minister, Others**

*EA1411160190 Kigali Domestic Service in French  
0430 GMT 13 Nov 90*

[Excerpt] Andre Geens, the Belgian minister of cooperation, continues his visit to our country. Yesterday morning he held talks with Dr. Casimir Bizimungu, our minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation. This was followed by a meeting attended by the ministers of planning, finance, commerce, and consumption, as well as the governor of the National Bank of Rwanda. Here is a report by Jean-Baptiste Nubahumpatse:

[Nubahumpatse] The state of relations between our two countries and the structural adjustment program currently in force in our country were discussed during the meeting. It is worth noting that Belgium's allocation to

our country in the framework of bilateral cooperation stands at about 1.2 billion Belgian francs a year. The Belgian minister of cooperation promised that his country was ready to participate substantially in the implementation of our structural adjustment program, which will cost us about \$120 million in the course of the first three years.

It was this particular program which attracted the attention of journalists during a press conference after the ministers' meeting this morning. Replying to a journalist who wanted to know the extent of the devaluation of our currency, the minister of finance, Benoit Ntigulirwa, pointed out that we should talk rather of adjustment than devaluation.

[Begin Ntigulirwa recording] As for the consequences, in fact we should rather talk of adjustment, because we had already realized that our currency was overvalued, so, we had to give our currency its correct value. That is why the (?special drawing rights) rose from 102.71 to 171.18 Rwandan francs. [passage omitted] [end recording]

#### **Zaire**

#### **President Mobutu Receives Patriotic Front**

*AB1411183890 Kinshasa AZAP in French 1140 GMT  
13 Nov 90*

[Text] Gbadolite, 13 Nov (AZAP)—The peace plan devised on 26 October by the Burundi-Uganda-Rwanda-Zaire quadripartite summit was the main topic discussed during the audience which Zairian President Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko granted yesterday afternoon in Gbadolite to a delegation of the Patriotic Front of Rwanda made up of five rebel combatants who will be members of the cease-fire monitoring group.

The meeting with the representatives of Rwandan rebels, which is taking place 72 hours after the one held with President Habyarimana, has enabled Marshal Mobutu to begin dialogue between the belligerents as he was charged to do during the summit by his counterparts from Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda. In fact on 10 November, the head of state had the opportunity to listen to the views of his Rwandan counterpart on implementing the Gbadolite peace plan whose (?main points) were approved in principle by the Patriotic Front.

The government's views were undoubtedly communicated to the two rebel representatives, Kayumba Nyamirasa and Musoni, by Marshal Mobutu, to whom the rebel representatives expressed their appreciation. They also presented to him their suggestions for peacefully settling the conflict.

After the discussions with the mediator, the Patriotic Front delegates said they would not have taken up arms against the Kigali regime if it had not turned a deaf ear to their grievances, namely the right to return to their country and be considered full Rwandan citizens. They



called for an end to what they called segregation and social injustice in Rwanda as well as qualitative changes in the institutions. They asserted that they are not fighting for ministerial posts.

#### **Rwandan Rebel Delegation Arrives for Talks**

*EA1411152590 Kigali Domestic Service in French  
1800 GMT 13 Nov 90*

[Text] The meeting of Army officer observers of the Rwandan cease-fire which was opened on Monday, 12 November in Goma, Zaire, resumed this evening. Our special envoy on the scene, Augustin Twagirayezu reports:

[Begin Twagirayezu recording] It will be recalled that discussions were suspended shortly after the opening session after a cable from Kampala announcing the imminent arrival of representatives of Inkotanyi, the Rwandan Patriotic Front, reached the delegations present in Goma. It was today at 1430 that they honored their commitment. A Zairian military aircraft landed at Goma Airport under heavy security. The delegation arrived from Gbadolite where it was reported to have held two rounds of talks with Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, the Zairian head of state, who is mediating in the conflict.

The Inkotanyi comprise Denis Karera, the commander and head of the delegation, (Tanzi Gasangwa), Theoneste Karenzi, Said Mugisha, and Hasan Mukeza, all of them commanders. They were in Uganda Army uniforms with the only difference that they did not wear (?ranks) on their epaulettes. During this evening's meeting, the delegations are to discuss the agenda and adopt working procedures. The Goma meeting is chaired by Major General [title as heard] Hashim Mbita, the representative of Salim Ahmed Salim, the OAU representative. [end recording]

#### **Habre Sends Message to Mobutu, Expects Aid**

*EA1511113090 Kinshasa Domestic Service in French  
0500 GMT 15 Nov 90*

[Text] Mr. Korom Ahmed, the Chadian minister of public health [as heard], who yesterday in Gbadolite delivered a message from President Hissein Habre to his Zairian counterpart, President Mobutu, informed the press at the end of the meeting that his country, now faced with armed aggression on its border with Sudan, expected a lot from Zaire, a country which had always helped it in defending its independence and territorial integrity. He refused, however, to specify the nature of the assistance expected from our country.

On the main content of the message which he was carrying, the Chadian minister stated that President El Hadj Hissein Habre informed Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko on developments in the military situation in the field. On this matter, the Chadian Army has managed to dislodge from its territory the attackers who took refuge [words indistinct] on Sudanese territory, the Chadian emissary disclosed. He also described as false the allegations that the attackers were reportedly Chadian rebels and challenged whoever made them to substantiate these allegations.

Chad has been under attack since 6 November 1990 by elements of the Islamic Legion trained and armed by Libya with the complicity of its allies [words indistinct].

The Chadian minister added that it was not because four Chadians had voluntarily left the political and military hierarchy of their country and were now among the invaders, that one should assume that the invaders were Chadian rebels. We are once again under attack from Libya, he stated.

## Uganda

### Rwandans Said Attacked by Gunmen at Border

AB1411180690 Paris AFP in English 1603 GMT  
14 Nov 90

[By Epajjar Ojullu]

[Text] Mbarara, Uganda, Nov 14 (AFP)—Some 13,000 Rwandans who fled to Uganda to escape the civil war are being moved away from the Rwandan border, where they say they have been attacked by gunmen, refugee officials said Wednesday. Despite the attacks by armed robbers who have reportedly stolen about 1,000 of the 6,000 head of cattle which the refugees brought with them, refugees of the Hutu tribe initially objected to moving to camps farther from the border because they were occupied by Tutsis. Hutus and Tutsis have a blood-steeped history of tribal war.

Thousands of Tutsis poured into Uganda after tribal massacres in 1959, when the Hutu tribe seized power from the Tutsis, Rwanda's traditional rulers, in the runup to independence in 1962. Age-old tribal animosities were rekindled when rebels led by mainly Tutsi exiles based in Uganda invaded Rwanda on October 1 in a bid to topple the Hutu-dominated government of President Juvenal Habyarimana. The refugees who have fled since the rebel invasion have said that Rwandan Government troops had massacred villagers, mainly Tutsis, although some Hutus had also been killed.

Officials of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) said Hutus among the refugees had initially opposed plans to move them to the predominantly Tutsi Nakivali refugee settlement, opened in 1962. A UNHCR official said Wednesday said the transfer was now going ahead, but that the refugees would only be settled temporarily in Nakivali, 35 kilometres (21 miles) east of here. The official said the refugees would stay three months in Nakivali until a new site could be found for them.

The head of the Nakivali camp, Bagenda Bagaya, said the transfer had started with 6,000 refugees from the border post of Kizinga, to be followed by 7,000 others from Kamwezi, Kitwe and Kakamba, also on the Rwandan border. The main problem in Nakivali, which had 6,500 refugees according to a census taken in September, is that it is overstocked with cattle. Mr. Bagaya said there were already 35,000 head of cattle in Nakivali, and the new refugees were expected to bring another 5,000 with them. Tutsis are traditionally cattle keepers, while the Hutus are pastoralists.

One refugee, Damiano Ruhindura, said three herdsmen had been abducted from the border by armed men who the refugees suspected were Rwandan Government soldiers. Refugees arriving at Nakivali have started building grass-thatched huts in the area. A British charity, Oxfam, has promised the refugees tents, but an Oxfam relief worker said it would take time to bring the tents to Nakivali.

### \* 'Minor' Recovery Threatened by Oil Price Rise

91AF0179A London AFRICA ANALYSIS in English  
28 Sep 90 p 11

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] Kampala—The exiled Kuwaiti government may come to the rescue of Uganda's fragile economy which is threatened with collapse as a result of the Gulf crisis. The prospect, which government sources admit is a 'long shot,' arises from recent talks between President Yoweri Museveni and Iraqi and Kuwaiti officials.

Ministers are now working round the clock to attempt to avert what all admit could be the 'catastrophic' effects of the crisis. According to sources within the ministry of planning and economic development, an additional \$3.5m a month will be needed from next month if the economy is to be held under control. But there seems little chance of sustaining the minor recovery, which has seen inflation reduced from more than 200 percent to 28 percent.

The full effects of the Gulf crisis will be felt here later next month when payments for orders made 2 months ago fall due. So far, petrol prices have risen by more than 60 percent from USh310 [Uganda shillings] to USh500 a litre.

Talks with the Nairobi-based Iraqi ambassador and Iraq's minister of labour and social affairs centred on the possibility of taking advantage of Iraq's offer of free oil to developing countries. This was followed 2 days later by a visit from Kuwait's exiled minister for communications who is understood to have agreed to take back to his government requests for help from Uganda.

The recent visit by President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria also resulted in a general agreement in principle to barter coffee and other agricultural produce for Nigerian oil products. But this is seen as a long-term prospect only.

Even before the Gulf crisis, fuel demand in Uganda outstripped supply. It is estimated that the country needed to increase by \$2m a month its \$6m a month fuel import bill to meet existing demand.

With transport prices now rocketing and filtering through into other sectors, inflation is in danger of becoming rampant again. Plans have already been drawn up to introduce petrol rationing. dl

### \* Leaders Seen Balanced Among Clans, Interests

91AF0180A London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL  
in English 28 Sep 90 pp 2-4

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] President Yoweri Museveni, it is generally agreed, is the best chief executive Uganda has had since independence. Even most political opponents recognise his achievement in bringing some stability to the country after the horrors of Idi Amin and Milton Obote's second government, locally known as Obote II.

As head of state, commander-in-chief of the National Resistance Army (NRA), chancellor of Makerere University, minister of defence, chairman of the National Executive Committee, chairman of the National Resistance Council, and current chairman of the Organisation of African Unity, Museveni is one of the most powerful Ugandans ever.

His international stature is growing apace, not least because of his association with the radical camp in southern Africa. (Uganda currently houses a contingent of African National Congress guerrillas.) He has the backing of Western donors, almost pathetically anxious to believe that Uganda has emerged from its long nightmare. He is well-viewed in Washington, despite his cordial relations with Libya. This may be explained not least by his skillful use of Maureen Reagan, the daughter of the ex-President of the United States, to advance Uganda's cause.

Museveni is generally recognised as a man of serious purpose, ambitious, highly intelligent and tactically shrewd. At the heart of his system of government is the army with which he took power in 1986, then only 5,000 strong but now believed to stand at a minimum of 75,000 men, and possibly twice that number. In 1989-90 it consumed 29 percent of the state budget. Senior government officials say they have no intention of pruning the size of the army.

Leaders of the NRA and of its political wing, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), conceive of the army as a political force which will transform Ugandan politics by demonstrating the virtues of discipline and unity, thus exposing the deficiencies of the main traditional parties, the Democratic Party (DP) and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC). This is another way of saying that they intend the military to remain at the centre of national life, as they have since Obote drew the army into politics in 1966.

President Museveni has given key jobs in government to veterans of his bush war, nearly all of them from Western Uganda like himself. Some were even born in neighbouring Rwanda, from where tens of thousands of refugees fled to Uganda in 1959-60. Many of Museveni's men are very young, which suits well the president's long-term ambition to transform Uganda by undercutting the old establishment.

The security apparatus is, of course, of crucial importance. Here, key departments have been given over to different western clans so as to make it less likely that they could ever combine against the president. Thus Military Intelligence is said to be a fief of the Banyarwanda. The External Security Organisation, under Amama Mbabazi, is dominated by Rukungiri and the International Security Organisation, under Brigadier Jim Muhwezi, is run largely by Banyankole and Bahima, the latter being Museveni's own ethnic group. Elsewhere in the Army, also, a high number of key posts are held by Westerners.

It is the preponderance of Westerners in the inner circle of the NRA which explains the political sensitivity of recent attacks by squatters on ranches in the west of Buganda. The squatters, probably related in some cases to NRA veterans are reclaiming land from which they were evicted in the early 1960s. Opponents allege that the government is in fact importing Rwandese to build its ethnic base, although there is no proof of this. The subject is explosive since it touches on the sensitive issue of ethnic manipulation.

Trusted Army veterans provide a crucial bloc of support in the national assembly, known as the National Resistance Council (NRC), and in its key body, the National Executive Committee. The 278-member assembly includes 10 army representatives, and has 38 seats allocated to what are called 'Original Members of the NRC,' bush war veterans, almost all from Buganda or the West. Twenty more members are nominated by the president.

The core power structure—consisting of the army, represented by the Army Council, the mysterious NRA High Command, and the presidency—is balanced by a cabinet constructed to represent various national interest-groups. Prime Minister Dr Samson Kisekka is supposed to coordinate departmental activity but is regarded as being too old to do the job effectively. The real strong man of the cabinet is First Deputy Prime Minister Eriya Kategaya, an NRA veteran who is Museveni's most trusted adviser and heir-apparent. He is certainly a member of the NRA High Command. Two other deputy prime ministers, the Catholic Paul Ssemogerere and the Muslim Abubakar Kakyama Mayanja, are of less weight. Together, this troika gives the prime minister's office a useful balance, religious affiliation being of fundamental importance in Ugandan politics.

Otherwise the cabinet is balanced to include representatives of every region. Some ministers are leading members of the DP [Democratic Party], including the party's leader Ssemogerere. He is not only second deputy prime minister but also minister of foreign affairs. Other ministers are former members of the UPC [Uganda People's Congress], the former ruling party overthrown in 1985-6. Those ex-UPC people in the government tend to be from the anti-Obote wing of the party, such as Ateker Ejalu, a minister of state in the present government. Others are arch-survivors, like Anthony Butele, also a minister of state in the president's office.

With over 70 ministers, the government is heavily over staffed. The reason is that, apart from transacting departmental business, the cabinet exists to provide jobs for former political opponents whom Museveni wishes to accommodate. This entails a certain cost in both money—in short supply, but available for politically important purposes—and political credibility. Thus when Museveni asked the NRC to extend his term of office as president until 1995, the council approved on condition its life was extended too. News that NRC members now have generous expense accounts and car



allowances has displeased many Ugandans, who are beginning to see the NRC as just another place for politicians to eat.

But Museveni has shown on occasion that he is willing to act against corruption. This is the most likely reason for last year's radical reshuffle of the NRA leadership (AC Vol 30 No 25). Detailed reports suggest that Museveni acted when he saw that corruption among some officers was affecting the efficiency of his beloved NRA, the one organ of state which he cannot afford to become unresponsive. He has yet to take similarly drastic measures against civilian officials in spite of scandals regularly turned up by the press or by the inspector-general of government, Augustine Ruzindana. It is not excluded that a few senior officials may become the subject of exemplary punishment in the near future. If not, the public will soon come to regard this government as barely cleaner than its predecessors, although undoubtedly better-disciplined and more prestigious.

The key to the president's strategy of co-opting politicians is his aim of destroying Uganda's two leading parties, the UPC and the DP. The UPC is traditionally strong among Protestants, especially outside Buganda. The DP is traditionally a Catholic Party. Uganda's last multi-party elections, in 1980, were widely regarded as having been stolen by the UPC to prevent a DP victory. It was this which Museveni gave as his reason for taking up the armed struggle against the UPC in 1981.

Museveni's attack on the old parties is on several fronts:

- He has declared all parties to be suspended, but has fallen short of banning them so that Uganda is not technically either a one-party or a no-party state. It is rather in political suspended animation.
- He is co-opting leading DP members including party leader Paul Ssemogerere, now first deputy prime minister and foreign minister. This has already thrown the DP into some disarray, provoking the creation of the DP Mobilisers' Group, which regards some of its leaders as having sold out. The press has not failed to note that the leading Mobilisers are all Baganda Catholics. At the same time, Museveni has exercised his personal charm on leading DP sympathisers including Cardinal Emmanuel Nsubuga, who has received Museveni as a house-guest on his ranch at Kyankwanzi. Some even hope that Museveni will one day restore the historic king of Buganda, the kabaka. To do this would win Museveni support in Buganda but would set up a new power-centre and would damage his left-wing credentials.
- The chances of dismantling the UPC are rather better. Always prone to in-fighting, the UPC was organised around the person of Milton Obote, now vegetating in exile. Those old UPC men who have joined the government will probably lose influence fairly rapidly, leaving a UPC rump outside. Current UPC leaders complain of harassment, including a series of arrests in late August. Their strategy appears to be to sit tight

and hope that the Museveni government will be a passing cloud. The eastern insurrection, more serious than is generally admitted, is largely animated by old UPC headquarters in Kampala wants nothing to do with this armed struggle. Museveni's key adviser on how to undo the UPC is said to be none other than the former UPC Secretary General Grace Ibingira. The association of this noted right-winger with the leftist Museveni is helped by the fact that Ibingira is of the Ankole royal family. He is now a businessman specialising in deals with Spain and is Spain's honorary consul in Kampala.

—Museveni is encouraging the National Resistance Movement [NRM] as a new political force. The official line is that this is a movement of all Ugandans and not a political party, but senior NRM officials agree that the NRM is in effect a ruling party with pretensions to a monopoly on power. Its chairman is Museveni himself. The vice-chairman, Haji Moses Kigongo, is a Muslim Muganda of royal blood. At the base, the Resistance Councils are popular and seem to work well but have virtually no revenue-raising powers. Although the NRM is billed as a left-inclined movement, designed to unify Ugandans, its historical antecedents are among anti-Obote Protestants and Monarchists from the West especially.

Altogether, it seems most unlikely that the DP and the UPC will simply wither away as NRM radicals initially hoped. If not, then Uganda will in fact be left with a three-party system. Museveni will then have created his own political base to rival the DP and the UPC, which was what he tried to do in 1980 before the bush war. He will then be well-placed to play party politics while appearing, as head of state, to be above the fray. We foresee Museveni taking this course, although Army officers who at present rule the roost may object to such a development.

The president has time to spare. He has promised to introduce a new constitution and new elections only in 1995. Meanwhile he is strong enough to deal with possible military rivals like Brigadier Moses Ali, a minister under Amin with a strong military following and good connections in Tripoli and Khartoum. Ali joined the Museveni government but was subsequently detained on a charge of treason. Judgement has yet to be made. Even veteran NRA men may feel they have been harshly dealt with. Presidential half-brother Salim Saleh was just one commander sidelined last year. He is now in business. Colonel Kahinda Otafire has been whisked away to a backroom job. This limits the influence of possible dissenters. It also has the side-effect of causing some Ugandans of conservative persuasion, such as Buganda monarchists, to believe that the president is gradually sidelining radicals and coming over to their way of thinking. They can draw heart from the fact that this is clearly true of the economic field, where the government has dropped its earlier ideological baggage and is now demonstrating a pragmatic approach.

The fact that the army is now declared to have an ideology and to be the people's friend is of cold comfort to some. There is no question but that the NRA is better disciplined than the armies of Amin and Obote II. However, there are abundant signs that it lacks the rigour which ministers claim. Stories abound of atrocities perpetrated by soldiers in operational zones in the North and East, and of petty or not-so-petty crime elsewhere. Businessmen in Kampala report a thriving trade in worn tyres which they sell to soldiers. The soldiers then exchange them for the new ones on military vehicles, which they sell for profit.

In just a few days, the Kampala press—relatively unfettered—carries stories of soldiers burning down huts with people inside near Soroti; of soldiers storming a police station at Mbale to release three of their comrades detained by the police; of soldiers involving themselves

in land disputes in Mawogola, and of squatters mysteriously acquiring weapons; and of soldiers firing in a disco in Gulu, killing three people.

Military corruption and inefficiency appear to be part of the reason why the army is finding it so difficult to defeat rebel groups in the North and East. In the latter especially, villagers are now going through a little of what the Luwero Triangle experienced in the early 1980s. Villagers in Kumi were earlier this year herded into camps as a part of army counter-insurgency measures (AC Vol 31 No 4). Almost any Ugandan who has family in this area has stories of relatives killed by NRA soldiers in search of booty, or under orders, or in revenge for past atrocities, or just brutalised by years of military service. In 1986, the NRA had an opportunity to win popular support in Acholi and Teso. Now, its chances of winning hearts and minds seem remote.



### No Place for ANC's MK in Defense Force

MB1411152690 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1502 GMT 14 Nov 90

[Text] Pretoria Nov 14 SAPA—The SADF [South African Defense Force] won't be split in order to accommodate Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of the Nation (MK)—ANC military wing], Defence Minister Magnus Malan said in Pretoria on Wednesday night. He was speaking at a reunion of veterans of Operation Savannah, when the SADF secretly invaded Angola in the mid-70s.

General Malan said: "A state has only one sword power—it accepted security services. It does not share this, otherwise it is weakened. We are entering the new South Africa with an indivisible defence force. Adaptations yes, but divisibility, no. For that reason there can be no place for MK as such in the current Defence Force."

Gen. Malan rapped the ANC [African National Congress] for its reaction to the Harms Commission report. "The last organisation which should pass judgment on the CCB [Civil Cooperation Bureau] is the ANC," he said.

"Whenever has it made itself subject to the laws of the land? The ANC should rather stay quiet. Its horrible deeds of terror, murder and mutilation have not been unravelled. Just think about Church Street 1983, Amanzimtoti, eating places, landmines in northern and eastern Transvaal, etc."

Gen. Malan said a small section of the SADF's Special Services, namely Region 6, had contaminated the CCB and had placed Special Services, an integral part of the SADF, under suspicion.

Gen. Malan said the fact that Special Services were the SADF's senses had prevented many disasters and saved numerous lives. Special Services supplied the SA [South African] Police with information from outside the country which had prevented a "black Christmas" in South Africa in the mid-80s. Gen. Malan said Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe had said at the time he would be welcomed by the ANC at the Union Buildings at Christmas in 1986.

### Ministers Issue 'Strongly-Worded' Statements

MB1511080190 Johannesburg Television Service  
in English 0500 GMT 15 Nov 90

[Text] Three senior cabinet ministers have released strongly-worded statements within hours of each other, attacking the ANC [African National Congress] and the SACP [South African Communist Party]. Among other things the ministers said in separate statements, were that the ANC was retarding the negotiation process. Some ANC members appeared to be uninformed, and were organizing campaigns conflicting with the undertakings given by the organization's leadership to the government.

The Communist Party and its leader, Mr. Joe Slovo, played a dominant role in the ANC, had his own plans

for the country, and disregarded any agreements. The ANC could not afford to comment on the alleged misconduct of some SADF [South African Defense Force] members, considering that the organization had committed innumerable acts of terror, and that Umkhonto we Sizwe [Spear of the Nation; ANC military wing] had no place in the current defense force.

Last night it was made known that three senior cabinet ministers concerned with the apparent procrastination of the ANC met their leadership a week ago to express the government's concern about the unjustified delay. The ANC responded by undertaking to see to it that ANC members would attend committee meetings regularly until the task of the relevant committees were completed.

Last night, Justice Minister Kobie Coetzee criticized the ANC's Western Cape branch for their mass mobilization campaign that begins today. The campaign is aimed at speeding up the scrapping of discriminatory legislation. Defense Minister Magnus Malan referred to various unsolved ANC acts of terror. Therefore, the ANC should rather not comment on the report of the Harms Commission of Inquiry into alleged hit squads.

Foreign Minister Pik Botha said in Prague, Czechoslovakia last night, that it seemed SACP head Joe Slovo was issuing statements in the ANC's name. He said this confirmed the Communist Party's dominant role in the ANC.

Mr. Botha, who is in Prague on the first leg of three East European countries, will meet Czechoslovakian President Vaclav Havel today. It is reported that South Africa and Czechoslovakia have agreed to resume relations at consulate level after a break of 27 years.

### Deputy Minister on Criteria for New Constitution

MB1511121990 Johannesburg International Service  
in English 1100 GMT 14 Nov 90

[From the "Africa South" program]

[Text] Possible constitutional drafts have in recent months been openly discussed in South Africa. The country's highest advisory body, the President's Council, recently published a report containing recommendations for a possible future constitution. Robert Miguel asked the South African deputy minister of constitutional development, Mr. Roelf Meyer, how the government views the different constitutional models being debated at the moment:

[Begin recording] [Meyer] I can't reply to all the proposals or plans that have come onto the table recently, because they are not coming from us in the first instance, and obviously we are still studying some of those. What is important to remember, is that we are still drafting our own plans. We have no blueprint yet as far as a new constitution for the country, [as heard] but as soon as we enter into negotiations, that will of course have to be ready.

[Miguel] But could you give us some indications about your [word indistinct].

[Meyer] There are two obvious goals that we have to satisfy, constitutionally speaking. One is that the Constitution must be democratic, in other words it has to provide for a vote for every person on an equal basis, and secondly, it has to provide for a solution to the conflict, or the potential for conflict in the country. In other words, we have to find a constitutional model that can satisfy the demands and the needs, that can accommodate the diversity that exist in our situation, and at the same time, of course, remain democratic in essence.

[Miguel] For years group rights and the definition of groups have been important ideas in South African politics. Will this remain so in future?

[Meyer] Well, the composition of our population will remain the same, and that is essentially what it is about. The emphasis on group or minorities is for that reason not only a matter of political expediency, but rather to give a reflection of what the composition of our population is, and the chief aim of a constitution, to our minds, would be to ensure a solution, a constitutional solution, in a way through which we can accommodate the diversity without ruling out the necessity of good government, without ruling out the opportunity for all to participate, and without ruling out the need to ensure proper and good management of the country.

[Miguel] But would this mean that, say for example, group rights could be substituted by minority rights?

[Meyer] Well, essentially we are talking about minority rights—minority rights on the basis of recognition, constitutionally, for those who would like to receive recognition, to provide for structured participation by those minorities.

[Miguel] And which rights would you like to see entrenched in a new constitution?

[Meyer] It's rather difficult. I would prefer to refer to the sort of mechanisms that one should look at. In the first place, there's the bill of rights that one should look at, through which protection of the individual aspirations can obviously be provided for, and matters like language, cultural rights, the religious rights, and even protection of property rights can be afforded through a bill of rights. So that's a very important mechanism also to ensure minority recognition. On the structural side, as far as a constitution is concerned, there are also obviously some mechanisms that one should look at, and what we are looking at is a combination of all those mechanisms. That would include devolution of power, autonomy of authority, divisions of power at the horizontal level, in other words through a system of checks and balances of constitutional rights, and lastly, voting or electoral procedures as a mechanism through which one can ensure minority participation.

[Miguel] Checks and balances means a second chamber, I would think so?

[Meyer] It would include a second chamber, but there could also be other mechanisms in the same category. For instance, to provide for the composition of the executive in a way that could include various minorities, for instance. A second house could be a very important mechanism also, but there are equally others. One can, for instance, provide for the position of the head of state to be divided into different posts, and through that one can say, well, provide for the one post to come from one house of parliament and the other one from the other house of parliament.

[Miguel] You mean, a prime minister and a state president?

[Meyer] That kind of arrangement, yes, but we are of course talking about possibilities and not exact plans. [end recording]

#### **SACP Denies Agreement Made on Arms Surrender**

*MB1411145890 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1413 GMT 14 Nov 90*

[Text] Johannesburg Nov 14 SAPA—The ANC [African National Congress] never undertook to hand over its weaponry to the government or to dissolve their underground structures, the SA [South African] Communist Party [SACP] said on Wednesday.

In a statement circulated by the ANC, South African Communist Party leader Joe Slovo accused Foreign Minister Pik Botha of making "unprincipled political capital" when he said in London that the ANC was putting up obstacles to negotiations.

Mr. Slovo said the ANC delegation at the Pretoria talks that resulted in the Pretoria Minute rejected the "attempt by the government delegation to get the ANC to stop mass action programmes."

Mr. Botha also reportedly said all stumbling blocks to full constitutional negotiations had been removed at the Pretoria meeting.

"On the contrary, our side emphasised that most of the obstacles to negotiations referred to in the Harare and UN Declarations remained in place," Mr. Slovo said.

He also denied the reported claim by Mr. Botha that the ANC agreed to assist in the identification of arms caches.

"Indeed, what actually happened was that we specifically informed the government delegation that our offer to suspend (and not abandon) armed actions did not include an agreement to hand over our weaponry or to dissolve our combat underground."

Mr. Slovo said he found it astonishing that a senior government minister who was present at the Pretoria meeting should distort its contents "to the point of displaying ignorance of the actual written agreement entered into."

**ANC Examines Land Ownership, Property Rights**

MB1411130490 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1154 GMT 14 Nov 90

[By David Greybe]

[Text] Johannesburg Nov 14 SAPA—More land must be made available free of charge to people in rural areas who stay together in one place and want communal ownership, according to the ANC [African National Congress] report on its recent workshop on land in South Africa, released in Johannesburg this week.

The ANC report also issued a call for banking systems to provide financial loans on the basis of future production, the establishment of "progressive" farmers unions, and the scrapping of all payments, salaries and legal privileges for chiefs and headmen.

The workshop group responsible for discussing communal land acknowledged though that "complexities" existed in different areas of the country concerning the legal protection of communal land.

Detailed resolutions concerning communal land holdings are listed in the ANC report:

"In urban areas a land trust must be created, where people agree: South Africa's shores, the sea and water resources, belong to all South Africans and must be used to their benefit as a sustainable resource. These should be controlled communally. There should be no private beaches. Legislation on labour rights should be extended to employees on both SA [South African] and foreign-owned ships;

"In terms of mining land: 1. Mine workers must have communal residential rights; 2. Mines must make land available for residential purposes; 3. Minerals should be controlled by the state;" (and)

"In rural areas where people stay together in one place and want communal ownership more land must be made available without cost."

In discussing the legal protection of communal land, and the issues it raised, including acknowledging "the complexities of different areas of the country," the ANC report said:

"The following legal options were considered but need more discussion and further investigation: (a) title deed for the community as a whole with the names of several democratically-elected members on the title deed, (b) within the community, individual rights of use and control must be recognised for (i), residential land, and (ii), a plot for crops, and (c) communal grazing or other lands."

Discussing the role of chiefs, it was recommended there was a need to:

Scrap all legislation pertaining to chieftainship including the Black Local Authorities Act No. 68 of 1951 and the Black Administration Act No. 38 of 1927;

"Denounce and scrap all the corrupt practices pertaining to chieftainship that have arisen in the course of our colonial history;

"Refrain from making any new laws which reserve a privileged position for chiefs and headmen;

"Scrap all payments, salaries and legal privileges for chiefs and headmen;

"Acknowledge the right of communities to democratically elect their own leaders and representatives."

The report added, though: "It should be noted that in the plenary discussion there was heated debate on this issue with some participants taking strong objection to what seemed to them to be a failure to acknowledge the positive contribution of some chiefs and the need to create a place for chiefs in the new dispensation;

"Recognise the freedom of communities to elect chiefs and headmen as individuals into positions of authority, provided this is done democratically—within the context of a new system of local government;

"Acknowledge the right of communities to recognise someone as their chief and to continue traditional practices of their own free will."

On the question of financing and communities, the ANC workshop called for:

"Alterations to the banking systems, permitting loans on the basis of future production; an active policy of state grants and assistance; the formation of credit unions with state assistance; the establishment of a rotating credit fund, by which farmers on communal land are assisted on a step by step basis for the acquisition of seeds, implements, etc; (and) the establishment of progressive farmers unions."

Delegates also proposed investigating the possibility of using communal lands and livestock as collateral.

On the issue of economic rights of individuals in a community, the ANC report is very detailed:

Communities must be allowed to democratically decide about newcomers from outside;

Individuals in the community should be given freehold title to a piece of land and that it be marketable.

"There should be a right to sell your house/structure on the residential plot, with community consent; there should be no right to sell communal land; there should be no right to sell or alienate residential land, although some people felt that there should be a right to alienate residential land;



"There should be no right to sell a farming plot; there should be a right to rent out residences with community consent; there should be no right to rent out a farming plot, as it belongs to the community; (and), the community should have a right of access to more land as it expands."

### **'Property of all the People'**

MB1411125490 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1204 GMT 14 Nov 90

[By David Greybe]

[Text] Johannesburg Nov 14 SAPA—All those in South Africa who have been dispossessed have a claim to land, according to the ANC [African National Congress] report of last month's Land Commission Workshop, released in Johannesburg this week.

Giving guidelines for arbitration, the ANC workshop resolved that all those who make a claim should submit their claims in the context of the establishment of a land claims process.

The report identified different categories of people whose land claims would be considered but declined to give priority to the different categories.

According to the report, "it was noted that the overall basis of our claims is the national claim of Africans to the land and continent of their birthrights."

Claims to land could be made by communities on the basis of tribal title deeds; by individuals on the basis of individual title deeds; on historical grounds by some communities against other communities who have tribal title deeds; by communities who received land as spoils of war; by relocated individuals and communities who want to return to their original land but do not have title deeds; by families and communities on the basis of their need for security to live and farm.

In developing criteria for a land claims commission to arbitrate in disputes, the ANC report highlighted the following points:

"Through nationalisation land will become the property of all the people; (and), all people in dispute over land should submit their claims to the Land Claims Commission for arbitration."

Giving guidelines for arbitration, the ANC workshop concluded: "all those who have been dispossessed have a claim to land; (and), all those who make a claim, should therefore submit their claims in the context of the establishment of a land claims process."

### **'Progressive Land Tax'**

MB1411151490 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1435 GMT 14 Nov 90

[By David Greybe]

[Text] Johannesburg Nov 14 SAPA—Citizens of a new South Africa should not expect to finance agriculture just from agriculture, according to the ANC [African National Congress] report of last month's Land Commission Workshop, released in Johannesburg this week.

Also, adopting a progressive land tax would not only provide much-needed income for government to provide services, but would also encourage corporate owners to give up their land holdings.

These resolutions are contained in the sixth and last section—"Forms of Production and Support Policies"—of the ANC workshop report.

It deals specifically with: "The need for an investigation into restructuring agriculture to make it more equitable, economically viable and sustainable."

According to the ANC report: "South Africa's human profile requires a strategy for land and people—for food sustenance, (and) creating an employment base in rural communities with viable incomes."

Six forms of organising production are mentioned: community, cooperative, private, state, joint ventures, and corporate.

"The (workshop) group discussed how these different forms of production could contribute to achieving, over a period of time, the overall strategy," the report said.

"They listed advantages and disadvantages and what could be modified within certain existing forms so that they make a better contribution. For example, in discussing corporate farms the group suggested that the following measures could be used to improve their contribution:

"Restrict their land holdings by preventing them from obtaining any more land;

"Impose a land tax to encourage corporate owners to give up land holdings;

"Provide tax incentives to corporate farms for worker participation schemes; (and)

"Identify community investment needs and request a corporate contribution to the community as a condition for continued corporate operation."

Adopting a progressive land tax, according to the ANC report, would serve a number of purposes:

"To ensure that those just holding land for speculative purposes give it up so that it may be used productively; to obtain an income for government so as to provide services; (and) to promote different forms of production."

The ANC workshop report cautions though that care should be taken in determining different tax criteria: definition of farm size, and definition of exemptions to the tax, would have to be investigated.

Viable rural communities, according to the report, would be communities where there was: income security; developing local markets; food supply (provision) to towns; a bid to decrease the communities' economic vulnerability—which requires diversification of agricultural activities into processing; and for supply outside the community.

In order to achieve a viable rural future, the reports adds, a strategy would be required for: skills training at community level, servicing, processing and loans and marketing infrastructure.

The report poses the question: "What is the economic context/situation in which we argue for major resources for restructuring agriculture?"

"1. Agriculture is not the major earning sector of the economy so we have a certain degree of flexibility comparative to other countries:

—"We don't have to compete on regional and international markets so we have room to manoeuvre." The report added though: "Others felt that this was not necessarily the case and this was identified as an area requiring further research and investigation.

—"export strategy to be reconsidered, and  
—"it is important that prices for producers secure them a decent income."

However, in the plenary session of the ANC workshop, "there was a debate on the significance of the agricultural sector in the macro economy and some participants felt that it was of greater significance than recognised by the group—making up 25 percent of foreign exchange earnings".

"2. We should not expect to finance agriculture just from agriculture. We need a net transfer to agriculture from the budget, i.e. from other sectors including mining, manufacture etc."

#### **Ownership, Labor Legislation**

MB1411144290 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1316 GMT 14 Nov 90

[By David Greybe]

[Text] Johannesburg Nov 14 SAPA—A future national land policy in South Africa should allow only limited private ownership, and outlaw the use of land for speculative purposes, according to the ANC [African National Congress] report of last month's Land Commission Workshop, released in Johannesburg this week.

This was carried in the report's section titled "Labour and Gender Rights in Relation to Land and Farm Work," one of six topics discussed at the six day workshop.

Some of the other resolutions which emerged from the "Labour and Gender Rights" group also overlap with decisions taken by some of the five other ANC workshop groups:

"Rights to land should apply to all South Africans regardless of gender from the age of majority or voting age;

"Labour tenants should be granted legal protection;

"The tot system should be abolished;

"The compound system should be abolished;

"It is essential that rural people participate in developing a national land policy;

"Land redistribution should be implemented as a matter of urgency to meet people's land hunger as well as to ensure the full and sustainable use of the land's potential;

"Where people have legitimate claims to land as determined by a Land Claims Court, the state should intervene to ensure that such land be returned to the people;

"Land for redistribution or state use should be acquired by the state through a number of mechanisms, which could include nationalisation;

"A national land policy should recognise different categories of land claims from: people who were forcibly removed from the land, labour tenants, widows and divorcees of land owners, titled owners of land, and occupants of land;

"There should be no child labour. Instead there should be a system of compulsory education;

"There should be a system of compensation for occupational injury;

"The Labour Relations Act (LRA) should apply to all workers, including farmworkers and off-shore workers, e.g. South African fishermen on foreign trawlers. The ANC Land Commission must work with COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions] to ensure that all farmworkers are included in the LRA;

"Occupational health and safety regulations should be integrated into the Labour Relations Act; (and),

"It should be a priority that farmworkers be organised."

#### **'Advantages', 'Disadvantages'**

MB1411153490 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1455 GMT 14 Nov 90

[Text] Johannesburg Nov 14 SAPA—Here follows a list of the advantages and disadvantages of a process of nationalisation of land in South Africa, according to the report of last month's ANC [African National Congress] Land Commission Workshop, released this week in Johannesburg.

Advantages:

"1. You can provide access to land without people needing money or taking on a heavy debt burden (loans);

"2. The state holds more power enabling it to: facilitate majority access to land; increase the potential for income redistribution; improve the potential utilisation of land;



create increased employment opportunities; (and) stimulate the macro-economy through land reform;

"3. National land property protects national sovereignty;

"4. Land becomes a nationally held resource, not a commodity which can be bought and sold;

"5. Nationalised land can help the implementation of a protectionist policy for people's access to land—but this needs a policy and additional legislation."

#### Disadvantages:

"1. Nationalisation may create land insecurity, or even a general economic collapse;

"2. State power is increased, which may not be a good thing—there exists a potential for the abuse of state power;

"3. producers can no longer use land as collateral with the banks;

"4. Loss of land by some producers may lead to recriminatory action;

"5. Insecure tenure may lead to land abuse—people may feel insecure about their leasehold so they take a short term exploitative view of land and soil use;

"6. Land nationalisation would have an impact on the financial system—leading to its partial collapse—which would require a financial strategy to prevent the worst effects of this collapse. This is because land nationalisation would abolish the property values of land. Therefore the balance of assets and liabilities of the economy are changed. Farmers stop paying bond repayments on land purchase and thus the land bank could collapse;

"7. People may be reluctant to carry out improvements to their land unless there is a scheme devised whereby tenants leaving farms receive payment for the land improvement they have made."

#### **PAC, Azapo Members on Negotiations Opposition**

*MB1511122990 Johannesburg International Service  
in English 1100 GMT 14 Nov 90*

[From the "Africa South" Program]

[Text] The call for all interested parties to get together around the negotiating table to find a common base on which to build this country's future has been welcomed in some quarters and rejected in others. The Azanian People's Organization [Azapo] and the Pan-Africanist Congress [PAC] have voiced their opposition to negotiations.

Philemon Tafo, the assistant secretary-general of the PAC, and Dr. Gomolemo Mokae of Azapo:

[Begin recording] [Tafo] I believe that the late president, Zephania Mothopeng was the first to put the current demand for a Constituent Assembly on the political agenda. That was in March, when we had a special

congress in Bloemfontein. That is our position on negotiations, and we say the mechanism, that is the mechanism through which the political problems in this country can be solved. And do we say we are not necessarily afraid of negotiations. I believe to fear talking is cowardice. But, at the same time, to go and negotiate in fear is definitely selling out. Now, we believe that we cannot negotiate in a situation where De Klerk is both the negotiator—that is the referee—and the player as well, and where we will be subjected to his security. We say that let it be elsewhere, a neutral venue and with a neutral chairperson.

[Dr. Gomolemo Mokae] Let me just (?clear) one correction first. The correction about the Constituent Assembly. The current demand for a Constituent Assembly started in 1985 when there were attempts to get people to negotiate through the national convention. Azapo opposed it and because of that opposition we lost a lot of people, from elements which wanted a national convention. And we started demanding a Constituent Assembly then. The second thing is the other movements, obviously you know as well as I do that the PAC is going to decide, is still going to decide about negotiations at their congress. Our position here is clear. We think that we cannot negotiate in a position where we are not equal partners, you know, whereby De Klerk is the one who called the negotiating mechanism, who instituted, and we participate. You know we think that our minimum demand of De Klerk is to step down. We can only negotiate whereby he has stepped down and he is an equal with us. That's when we would start negotiating. And (?even) still, when we do negotiate there are two things which are nonnegotiable as far as we are concerned. What is nonnegotiable is the repossession of land, and what is also nonnegotiable is the drastic change of the economy toward a socialist direction for the equitable definition of the wealth of the country.

[Unidentified Reporter] But doctor, don't you think before achieving all this one has to start somewhere laying a foundation for the actual talks about a Constituent Assembly.

[Dr. Gomolemo] Well, you see the foundation for our oppression has been laid over a long period of time, I think we have been patient enough for more than 300 and—from over 330 years—that we've been oppressed and the foundation has been laid throughout then. You know, I don't think it is unfair for us to demand of an illegitimate minority regime to step down if it's really genuine about having a just order in this country. We don't think it is an unfair demand. It is a demand which should be fair in any circumstance. Be it in Europe or in Africa, of an illegitimate minority regime, to step down if it says that it is sincere about redressing the imbalances and the unjust order which has been going throughout. [end recording]

**Battle of Ideological Differences in PAC Viewed**

*MB1511070790 Cape Town SOUTH in English  
8-14 Nov 90 p 19*

[Article by Rehana Rossouw: "PAC Hampered by Lack of Programme"]

[Text] There are no divisions in the PAC [Pan-Africanist Congress], but distinct ideological differences which will battle for supremacy at its congress to be held in December, says Dr. Seshi Chonco, a lecturer in the political science department at UWC [University of the Western Cape].

The organisation faces its most crucial period in its history as it plans its first congress to be held inside the country since it was banned 30 years ago.

One of the major issues at the congress will be the debate on negotiations.

State President F.W. de Klerk has invited the PAC to join the government and the ANC [African National Congress] around the negotiation table.

"There is a very intense debate on negotiations taking place in the PAC, both inside and outside the country," said Chonco.

"There is a strong support among the exiled PAC in favour of negotiations. Inside the country there is division between the pro- and anti-negotiations forces.

"The youth in the Azanian Youth Unity (AZANYU) have already taken a clear position against negotiations."

Chonco said on the basis of its past performance, the PAC would be better off accepting negotiations as a tactic of struggle.

By doing so, it would not be renouncing its principles as there was nothing in its constitution arguing against negotiations.

The PAC, when deciding on the issue at the congress, should lay down clear terms for its participation—that there be a Constituent Assembly for instance, said Chonco.

Since receiving the invitation from the government, the organisation has been consulting its membership on the issue as well as holding discussions in Zimbabwe between its internal and external wings.

"This must be commended, but it remains to be seen if the grassroots membership will impact on the upper echelons of power in the organisation," Chonco said.

"If it rejects participating in the negotiation process it risks marginalising itself."

Chonco said in the light of the "glasnost" in South Africa, the attitude of Southern African leaders towards South Africa had changed.

The centre of politics in the region was moving towards South Africa, and the PAC had yet to recognise this fact, he said.

The strength of the PAC's military wing, the African People's Liberation Army (APLA) was difficult to determine, but according to Stato evidence, it had intensified its activities inside the country since 1988.

"This was not on a scale to be regarded as a threat to the state, though," Chonco said.

Other historical factors also influenced the growth of the PAC inside the country.

The organisation had always been a mass movement and its strategies based on mass recruitment of membership, said Chonco.

Chonco said the fiercest debate at congress was expected on the issue of leadership.

"While there are no real divisions in the organisation threatening to split it, there are three distinct strands of thought.

"After the PAC was banned in 1960, its president, Robert Sobukwe, approached Patrick Leballo to constitute a presidential council in exile to organise the launch of a military wing."

While the leadership was in exile, differences emerged over the handling of finances and the policies of the organisation.

"There are some activists in the organisation who still believe the PAC should retain its philosophy of African Nationalism.

"Others in the organisation believe the organisation should embrace the programme of Maoism."

Chonco said disenchantment set in with the leadership of Leballo in exile and several members supporting Mr. A.B. Ngcobo were expelled.

"There have been differences over the extent of the support members should give Ngcobo," Chonco said.

"These same differences emerged when the Sobukwe Faction questioned the constitutional legality of the present executive committee.

"The Sobukwe Faction, which does exist and has support, could shake the congress," said Chonco.

The Sobukwe Faction comprises people who joined the PAC at its inception and argue that the organisation should maintain its African Nationalism ideology.

"They argue that the present PAC executive committee has not been properly constituted.

"It's a valid argument as the only properly constituted executive committee was elected in 1959. The Sobukwe Faction is now calling on the present executive to resign.

"They also argue that the PAC must move away from the policies of socialism."

Chonco said the debate was not just centred on ideological principles but involves alliances as well.

The Sobukwe Faction, in their definition of Africanism, would regard Chief Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party as an organisation promoting African nationalism as well.

"Buthelezi heads an organisation for Africans and is a firm believer in African leadership.

"He says he supports the concept of an elective system of government based on one person, one vote in a unitary South Africa.

"This, some activists in the PAC believe, makes it possible for the organisation to form an alliance with Buthelezi."

Natal PAC leader, Prince Velekhaya Shange, argues that the PAC should enter into an immediate alliance with Inkatha.

Shange has already accepted invitation to speak on Inkatha platforms.

Chonco said these initiatives had not been condemned by the PAC leadership.

In fact, the PAC had written several letters to Buthelezi before its unbanning this year inviting him to talks exploring the possibility of an alliance. The talks were not realised because of differences over a venue.

"Buthelezi wanted to know why the PAC wanted to talk to him in Zimbabwe. He wanted to know why there was such secrecy, why the meetings could not take place openly.

"But it seems as if Buthelezi is prepared to form an alliance with the PAC. It will not be an exaggeration to argue that Buthelezi will be prepared to allow the PAC to contest power on a national level while he builds his regional base."

Chonco said he had noticed that the PAC had never made a formal statement denouncing Inkatha's role in the violence.

The only statements from the organisation at the height of the Reef violence had appealed to all groups to end the violence.

Chonco said the Sobukwe Forum was definitely coming to congress. He interviewed several of its supporters recently who said they were releasing a position paper on their beliefs.

The Forum challenged the PAC to go back to its roots—that of Africanism. "The Sobukwe Forum fears that elections at the congress may be rigged, they argue that

the PAC has a history of authoritarianism where people are appointed rather than elected.

"Some of the activists in exile feel the organisation is rushing into elections which do not favour them because they are not acquainted with the constituency inside the country.

"They fear Mr. Johnson Mlambo, the chairperson of the exiled movement, may become president without being elected."

Another "strand" in the PAC was the Pan-Africanist Movement offshoot who, although Africanist in orientation, used socialist rhetoric.

Unlike the African socialism preached by Sobukwe, this strand favours democratic socialism and was largely associated with the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU).

Yet the PAC was not divided, said Chonco.

"There is a diversity of opinion but the entire membership is informed by their Africanist consciousness.

"Unlike other political organisations, the PAC does not have charismatic personalities among its leadership, and this has lessened the risk of factionalism.

"The organisation is merely suffering from the effects of glasnost in South Africa—just like the Democratic Party, the ANC [African National Congress] and the Conservative Party," Chonco said.

"What is going to be decisive for the future of the organisation is whether the congress will arm it with a clearly defined leadership, philosophy and programme.

"Until now, the PAC has succeeded in defining itself against ANC positions on a range of issues. But it cannot deceive itself that this strategy will work in the future.

"The congress must elect a leadership which will give the organisation clear direction and goals."

"On the basis of my studies conducted both internally and externally, the organisation seems to have a lot of support which has not been translated into real membership.

"Its supporters have to be offered a clearly defined programme which will make them feel at home in the organisation."

Chonco said the PAC had success in organising in the rural areas because of its emphasis on the question of land.

It had to succeed in addressing the urban constituency although it had good support in the Cape Peninsula and Soweto.

"But this support is limited if you look at the potential base which exists. The organisation needs to work aggressively towards establishing branches.



"The PAC must stop defining itself against the ANC. If it is creative enough, it has the potential of becoming a mass organisation in the tradition of the Black Consciousness Movement.

"It is premature for the organisation to prepare for the seizure of power. It would be better off if it concentrated on addressing people's grievances and make them impact on the organisation's programme.

"Even if talks succeed, it is unlikely to lead to a radical transformation of people's lives. It is unlikely to fulfill the long-cherished dreams of people in the black townships.

"It is the task of the PAC to spell out those dreams and create a programme spelling out clearly how those dreams can be realised."

### **NP Constitution Blueprint 'Classic' U.S.-Style**

MB1511064490 Cape Town SOUTH in English  
8-14 Nov 90 p 2

[Report by Mono Badela: "Nat Plan for SA"]

[Text] Johannesburg—The National Party's [NP] constitutional blueprint, which it hopes to submit at the negotiation table next year, is taking shape behind close doors, according to a report in London.

The latest issue of FRONT FILE, a subscriptions only newsletter published in London, says the blueprint is a "classic United States-style geographic federation" consisting of 10 or 12 semi-autonomous regions and a powerful Supreme Court as a final arbiter of the constitution.

It includes a Charter of Human Rights and a division of power between the Supreme Court, a bicameral legislature and a rotating executive Presidency with prescribed powers.

Minority interests will be protected through a combination of the Human Rights Charter, entrenched constitutional guarantees within a free market system and frequent elections and proportional representation at all levels of government.

The plan allows neighbourhoods to take decisions on their own schools as long as these do not impinge on the human rights of others as protected by the Charter of Human Rights.

Autonomous regions will be able to decide on economic and security issues and will even determine regional official languages, anthems and flags, provided the national symbols are accepted as the highest embodiment of the state.

Several important aspects of the party's constitutional vision have yet to be finalised. One of the most contentious is the exact nature of the executive.

It talks about a rotating executive Presidency, with limited powers. The president would be chairperson of the Cabinet based on proportional representation and consensus decision-making.

Significantly, the National Party has dropped its earlier demand for specific guarantees for the white minority, even on a temporary basis as was the case with Zimbabwe.

A notable feature of the constitutional plan is the pivotal position of the Supreme Court as interpreter of the Constitution and its power to test decisions of the executive and a two chamber legislature similar to the U.S. Congress.

### **CSS Report Notes 2.1 Percent Decline in GDP**

MB1411130690 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1145 GMT 14 Nov 90

[Text] Johannesburg Nov 14 SAPA—South Africa's gross domestic product [GDP] declined by 2.1 percent in the third quarter, the fourth consecutive fall states Central Statistical Services [CSS].

Biggest contributor to the fall was the agricultural sector which declined by 32.8 percent during the quarter, gained 15 percent in the second quarter, fell by 20.7 percent in the first three months of the year and 36.9 percent in the fourth quarter of 1989, after gaining 58.7 percent in the second quarter of last year.

The organisation states: "Compared with the second quarter of 1990, the total seasonally adjusted real GDP fell by 2.1 percent at market prices (and annual rates) in the third quarter."

This follows a decline of 2.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 1989, 1.9 percent in the first quarter of this year, and 1.3 percent in the second. CSS says that the non-agricultural sector showed a small increase of 0.1 percent compared to a decline of 1.9 percent in the second quarter. In real terms, the mining industry showed a growth of 4.3 percent in the quarter while the tertiary sector increased by 0.7 percent.

### **Production Price Index Rises Sharply in Sep**

MB1211094390 Johannesburg Domestic Service  
in English 0900 GMT 12 Nov 90

[Text] South Africa's production prices continued to rise sharply in September, spurred on especially by higher fuel prices.

According to a statement released by Central Statistical Services in Pretoria, the Production Price Index [P.P.I.] in September came to an annual rate of 11.8 percent, 1.3 percent higher than August's 10.5 percent.

Our economics staff report that the P.P.I. is a good indicator of what to expect from the Consumer Price Index, and that the October inflation rate will probably also show a sharp increase.

The prices of South African goods continued making the largest contribution to the rate of increase, imported prices rose by an annual rate of just over four percent. Relatively big monthly price increases were recorded by petroleum and coal products, electricity, gas and water, clothing and certain food products.

#### Press Reviews on Current Problems, Issues

14 November

MB1411130190

[Editorial report]

#### THE STAR

Harms Report 'Failure of Public Accountability'—The public needed to hear from the Harms Commission inquiry into death squads that "allegations of officially-sanctioned murder had been probed to the bone and that any irregularities or crimes unearthed would be followed to their conclusion," declares Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 14 November in a page 14 editorial. But "by that yardstick, the findings released yesterday fall frighteningly short of the target and constitute a dismaying commentary on the failure of public accountability." The "ghosts" of hit-squads "have not been laid to rest." The "culprits are out there untouched and capable of striking again."

#### BUSINESS DAY

Call for Malan Resignation—"The public is less likely to be satisfied with the findings of the Harms Commission than a government which believes it has been absolved of responsibility for political assassinations," notes Johannesburg BUSINESS DAY in English on 14 November in a page 10 editorial. "But questions remain—particularly whether Defence Minister Magnus Malan can avoid paying the price of ministerial responsibility." Malan says the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) is a "small rogue unit which committed crimes for which he cannot be held politically accountable," and President de Klerk, "unfortunately, appears to agree. His admirable sentiments about future reconciliation lead him into a trap; they threaten the democracy on which he hopes to build the future." BUSINESS DAY says "Malan is politically responsible. His CCB henchmen are going; if public confidence is to be restored, he must go too."

#### SOWETAN

Mangope Attack on ANC To Cause 'Instability'—Referring to the Bophuthatswana government allegations that it had uncovered an ANC plot to assassinate Chief Mangope, Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 14 November in a page 6 editorial says: "The attack that Bophuthatswana is launching against the ANC will create instability." Mangope is "embarrassing State President F.W. de Klerk, who might find it extremely difficult to support Bophuthatswana in the manner that

Mr. P.W. Botha did at the time of the unsuccessful coup." "Already the people of Pretoria have been asked to mobilise action against the legitimacy of Bophuthatswana. We are afraid this type of action will fuel rather than decrease aggressive attention on him and his state."

15 November

MB1511120290

[Editorial report]

#### THE STAR

Ministers', Officials' 'Lack of Accountability'—Johannesburg THE STAR in English on 15 November in a page 18 editorial says the Harms Commission report on an inquiry into activities of death squads emphasizes the "total lack of accountability" of key figures who should bear "moral responsibility for the abuses committed by their underlings." "The finger points first at Defence Minister Magnus Malan" who in a "normal democracy, where proper accountability applies" would be expected to resign. "General Geldenhuys, who could be seen as next in the chain of accountability, retired last month. Also involved in the CCB [Civil Cooperation Bureau] chain of administration was General 'Kat' Liebenberg, who not only emerges unscathed but has just been promoted to chief of the SADF [South African Defense Force]." "Much tighter control of the country's intelligence agencies is clearly needed."

Mangope's Maneuverings May Retard Negotiations—Bophuthatswana's President Lucas Mangope is "fast making himself the new P.W. Botha" of southern Africa. He snubbed a recent meeting between leaders of the "independent" homelands and the African National Congress (ANC), and recently detained dozens of ANC activists in Bophuthatswana. "These crude political manoeuvrings, arising out of Mangope's inordinate fear of opposition, have cast serious doubts on his political future and could retard progress towards negotiations."

#### SOWETAN

Criticism of Harms Findings—The "most serious thing" about the findings of the Harms Commission is that "those allegedly responsible for appalling crimes will remain unpunished and unblamed," declares Johannesburg SOWETAN in English on 15 November in a page 6 editorial. The inquiry "lays no blame at the door of the politicians" and that is "totally unsatisfactory." "There is no doubt in our minds that there are elements who have acted in the despicable ways ascribed to the CCB and other hit squads, and that they will strike again. We know that, even if we cannot prove it, there are rogue elements in the police force and perhaps also in the SADF who will create the type of pain and instability seen in the recent past."



## SOUTH

**'Knee-Jerk' Repression—**Cape Town SOUTH in English for 8-14 November in its "Comment" column notes that Law and Order Minister Adriaan Vlok has "once again resorted to kragdadigheid [show of force] to solve a political crisis" by imposing a state of emergency in the Wynberg magisterial district and a curfew on Khayelitsha. "The iron fist approach cannot possibly resolve the deep-seated grievances." There can also not be round table discussions at a national level and "knee-jerk repression on the ground."

## BEELD

**CP Reformists Must Be Assertive—**The Johannesburg BEELD in Afrikaans of 12 November states in an editorial on page 8: "Last week this newspaper pointed out that the result of the Randburg by-election means the Conservative Party [CP] has no chance of taking over the government. At the same time, though, the CP is an important factor in parliamentary politics. For the party to threaten to become a protest movement, therefore, is senseless and highly irresponsible." The message from Randburg was "simple but logical: become a part of the negotiation process." There are signs that this message has "penetrated to certain CP leaders" since gradually their "rigid attitude" against contact with the ANC is being abandoned and their position on negotiation softening. "We hope the number of reform-minded people within the CP grows and that they can act with greater assertiveness. If they cannot convince the frustrated mass of CP supporters, a lot of heartbreak and disillusionment lie ahead."

## DIE BURGER

**ANC Actions Do Not Boost Credibility—**"It is clear that certain factions within the ANC still cannot make the leap from a so-called liberation movement to a fully fledged political party," says an editorial on page 14 of Cape Town DIE BURGER in Afrikaans on 9 November. "Mrs. Winnie Mandela's call on 7 November for an intensification of the 'struggle on all fronts' is more proof of how difficult the ANC is finding it to break away from its revolutionary ways." "For that reason President De Klerk's warning that same day against the ANC's inflexible political thinking is most timely. Some people within the organization have clearly not distanced themselves from their strategy to destabilize the country and overthrow the government through violence." "The ANC, which saw itself as the movement with by far the strongest support in the country, has meanwhile been rudely brought back to earth with, among others, its failed recruitment drive in the western Cape province and surrounds. Now certain leaders want to revert to intimidation and other forms of violence in order to enforce the organization's authority. This will not boost the ANC's credibility as a political party. Just the opposite."

## TRANSVALER

**ANC Must Heed De Klerk's Call on Destabilization—**The ANC leaders and allies would be sensible if they heed the state president's words in Bethelhem on intimidation, destabilization, and the building up of military might, notes an editorial on page 8 of the Johannesburg TRANSVALER in Afrikaans of 9 November. "It has long been clear that certain people and groups are using a strategy which Mr. de Klerk rightly labelled as another form of violence. The government's patience, and that of the majority of the population, has run out." The ANC leaders and allied organizations must "take responsibility for the actions of their followers. It is time that these would-be statesmen use their influence positively before the government is compelled to use its muscle."

## \* Formulation of Land Reform Policy Viewed

91AF0164C Johannesburg FINANCIAL MAIL  
in English 12 Oct 90 pp 20-21

[Text] With the latest announcements on land reform, the stage is being set for blacks to regain the position they once held as efficient farmers. But tremors of uncertainty, particularly among whites, suggest that the issue needs to be thoroughly thought through—and explained.

The proposed repeal of the two cornerstones of rural apartheid, the 1913 Land Act and the 1936 Development Trust & Land Act, follows publication of two major policy documents dealing with land tenure and agricultural issues. These are the Urban Foundation (UF)'s Rural Development (part 4 of Policies of a New Urban Future) and SA [Republic of South Africa] Chamber of Business (Sacob)'s more generic Economic Options for S.A.

The effect of the changes will be to open all agricultural land within the country to acquisition by blacks. (The rights of coloureds and Indians to land will be rectified, the UF [Urban Foundation] points out, by repeal of the Group Areas Act.) The problem remains how to make significant areas available to blacks while concurrently maintaining respect for white property rights. The proposals also leave on the table the equally important question of how land tenure and agriculture in the homelands (the self-governing states) are to be rationalised.

All the agonies and desires of the SA political conflict are mirrored in the land issue. Statistics reported by the UF for 1985 show that the "white" rural areas accommodated nearly 4.3m people (of whom 78 percent were black, 12 percent coloured and 9 percent white). The homeland rural areas contained 8.1m, almost all black. The chart illustrates the population densities in the "white" platteland and in the homelands.

At one extreme of the political spectrum, conservative white farmers have reacted with shock and horror to the prospect of having black farmers as neighbours on a basis of equality of ownership—even though the white platteland is already around 90 percent black, and many

farms owned by absentee landlords have for decades been operated by black managers.

A map, published in volume 2 of *THE OXFORD HISTORY OF SA*, and dated as long ago as 1971, shows an astonishingly high proportion of farms in the southern OFS [Orange Free State] even then unoccupied by whites. They fell into the categories "abandoned or unoccupied," occupied only by blacks, or occupied by a foreman or sharecropper.

At the other extreme, the Pan-Africanists openly repudiate all white title to land, proposing to turn back the pages of history to 1652! This is impractical because it could only be imposed at the end of a savage civil war lost by the whites; and inequitable because the line of final prescription has to be drawn somewhere.

In any case, not all white title to land derives from conquest: some land was bought freely from black owners over time.

The position of the ANC on land is not in all respects clear, but the latest policy statement explicitly calls for reinstatement of the freehold and labour tenancy rights of rural blacks relocated from so-called "black spots" during the Nationalists' tenure of office. The issue of forced removals aside, there is room for strong suspicion that the ANC still hankers for a collectivist approach to land.

The UF urges the setting up of a tribunal to adjudicate the rights of relocated rural blacks. Sacob too proposes a "new legal mechanism to resolve land conflicts."

The idea of a tribunal to rectify abuses of natural justice over land is a good one, subject to certain conditions. Firstly, it should be presided over by judges assisted by assessors with knowledge of the relevant issues; secondly, it should operate within a cut-off point, and 1948 makes good sense here; and lastly, it should not be empowered to take away rights from the current owner who acquired them in good faith.

Where a case is made out, the dispossessed black owner or labour tenant should be entitled to compensation, not from the good-faith owner, but from a fund financed by the Treasury and set up for this purpose. Perhaps there might even be compensation for non-material losses (pain and suffering) endured during forced removals.

The remainder of Sacob's policy statement on land ownership makes excellent economic sense. We should remove all legal restrictions on land ownership by blacks (which government has accepted); reform the different land Acts to accommodate ownership by small-scale farming entrepreneurs; reform financial intermediaries, including the Land Bank, so that they will provide financial assistance to small-scale black farmers in those areas where they can operate effectively; establish a total institutional framework to sustain the programme for potential black farmers to return to independent farming; and provide more land for low-income housing in urban areas.

The nucleus of a bank of land for sale or lease to convincingly qualified potential black farmers already exists in the hands of the SA Development Trust—the 2m ha [hectare] of "released areas" land derived from the 1936 provisions for black land acquisition and seemingly not yet disposed of but leased to white farmers.

If the process of rationalising white agriculture through establishing market-related pricing is carried through, this stock of land could be augmented. There could be purchases on reasonably generous terms of the land of farmers rendered sub marginal by the cut in output prices from too-high administered levels. (A pension scheme for elderly displaced farmers would not come amiss.)

The rationalisation of agricultural prices seems necessary anyway if additional output by a new wave of effective independent black farmers is to find a market.

Taking account of the indebtedness of white farmers to the Land Bank (some R2.7bn [rands] at the end of 1988), there might even be scope for deals for part purchase of land at good prices in exchange for a farmer's mortgage obligation—to augment the stock of land for resale still further.

Sacob warns that there is an overall limit to this policy: the potential of the agricultural sector to feed the population of SA should not be impaired by a programme to re-establish black land ownership. The goal must be achieving the more efficient use of resources in the agricultural sector, given the need to feed a fast-growing urban population.

This sound approach implies that it is not the land of efficient farming corporations or of large efficient farmers that should be looked to, contrary to UF hints.

The question of rationalising land use in the homelands remains as an independent and pressing concern. UF statistics show that a mere 10 percent of the income of the "black" rural areas is derived from agriculture. Evidently, these areas are today little more than wretched dormitories unnaturally dislocated from their main source of income in the cities because of apartheid.

The first step to remedying the ills of these areas is to permit urbanisation to proceed. There is little doubt that this process is now vigorously under way with the repeal of influx control—hence the proliferation of urban squatter camps.

The process of urbanisation makes it cheaper to provide essential services to concentrated populations: cities are efficient economic mechanisms. The free-market thinker, therefore, rejects the ideas that rural poverty should be subsidised where it is currently located. Reducing rural population densities in this way is how all industrial countries have solved the problem of rural poverty.

But the engine of the whole process is rapid industrial growth—which we need anyway to finance the pressing

needs of the agricultural reform programme. To this extent, the solution to rural problems is urban, as it always has been.

The UF favours special treatment for the black rural areas, but there is a case to be made even here for a free-market solution. Let the archaic forms of land occupation, including "permission to occupy," deed of grant and quitrent, be converted to freehold.

Those families wishing to move to the cities (surely a high proportion) would then be able to realise cash to help their relocation. Other blacks could then buy the land for farming operations. Indeed, some sources say an informal process of "lease" of land in the homelands to blacks keen to farm is already under way. This natural process would benefit by becoming legal.

There are those who question whether blacks can make efficient agriculturalists. Yet it was the very success of blacks as independent farmers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries which provoked an earlier wave of measures to drive them off the land—to destroy fierce competition and to provide labour for mining and industry.

By reinstating a strong class of individual black proprietor farmers, we will deal both bigoted white supremacists and lurking collectivists a mortal ideological blow.

#### \* ANC Membership Configuration Changing

9:AF0164A Johannesburg WORK IN PROGRESS  
in English Sep 90 pp 25-26

[Report by Jenny Cargill: "The Same Political Home for the Hunter and the Hunted"; first paragraph WORK IN PROGRESS comment; quotation marks as published]

[Text] As the ANC [African National Congress] develops into a mass-based political movement, the nature of its membership is changing. In the Northern Transvaal, for example, militant youth and the Bantustan police who used to be their jailers are now members of the same organisation.

'You people want to nationalise everything, but you don't want to use a public call box,' retorted a Gazankulu businessman when the ANC organiser had asked to use his phone.

The young activist had not identified himself. But obviously there was something about him which triggered the garage owner's suspicions—perhaps his youth, confidence and white companion. When told we were in the area on Catholic affairs, the businessman was satisfied. 'Oh, they also like this non-racialism,' was his response.

With Gazankulu's Hudson Ntsanwisi still clinging to the past, it is doubtful that this particular businessman has broken ranks and crossed over to the ANC. But it is not inconceivable that at some stage he will.

Just next door in Venda, for instance, the ANC leadership's first journey to the north was at the invitation of local entrepreneurs.

The massive convergence on the ANC, by social and class formations largely absent from its ranks before its unbanning, is to be expected—and is certainly not particular to the Northern Transvaal. But what is peculiar to this vast area is the high concentration of some of these groups.

Spanning four Bantustans—KwaNdebele, Lebowa, Gazankulu and Venda—the bulk of formal black employment is inevitably in the civil service and security forces. There is a multitude of tribal administrations, which until now have been securely locked into a well-developed system of state patronage. And under the wing of 'separate development', black entrepreneurs have to some extent found succour.

The shift within these groups towards the ANC has a number of implications. For one, it has already had an effect on the face of the organisation—although it is still too early to predict the full impact on its character.

Secondly, it presents the ANC with the tricky issue of combining and balancing all these interests in a way which strengthens its hand at negotiations while meeting the aspirations of the people.

In the past, the most militant formations in the north—the ANC underground and the South African Youth Congress (Sayco)—completely dominated political activity. Parents, as one young activist put it, 'just watched from the grandstand'.

That's changed now (although the youth still kicked off the current wave of mobilisation), and identification by parents with the ANC is no doubt being made easier by the presence of many older activists in the interim leadership structures.

The launch of ANC branches is well underway in the area, with a regional conference set for October, and civic and village committees—drawing representation from right across the communities, including policemen and tribal chiefs—have mushroomed. As a result it was possible to put a regional civic body in place in August.

Teachers are grouped into four new progressive associations, with a regional umbrella body in the pipeline, and Contralesa [Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa] is finding tribal chiefs increasingly receptive to its message. Recently, an ANC recruiter was surprised to find as many as 100 headmen and chiefs at a Contralesa meeting in a remote area of Venda. A substantial number took out ANC membership.

The Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (Popcru) has representation in remote rural villages, with the ANC reporting a growing interest among members of the security forces to join either its ranks or mass democratic movement structures.



As elsewhere, black expectations have exploded into militant action. Pietersburg, for instance, now reports the highest number of industrial court hearings in the country. A strike wave in Seshego in July/August highlighted the political context of the labour militancy. 'We have joined the cause', was the succinct explanation by one worker for downing tools. The unbanning of the ANC, many said, had given them the 'courage' to challenge their poverty wages—sometimes as little as R25 [rands] a week.

But the pitfalls for the ANC are many.

People remain deeply suspicious of the Bantustan leaders and the chiefs who identified with the past regimes, and acceptance of ANC policy to win them over to their side is by no means automatic. When ANC national organiser Steve Tshwete went to open a Venda Chamber of Commerce conference in June, a joint rally with new military ruler Brigadier Gabriel Ramushwana attracted just a handful of supporters. It was a salutary lesson to the ANC on the need for local consultation.

A Venda activist also reported some instances of villages trying to keep their chiefs out of their emergent committees. 'Many people feel chiefs need to pay for past sins', he said.

The regional ANC structure is liaising with all Bantustan leaders except Ntsanwisi—but even he has not been ruled off the consultation list. In Venda, a working group was set up when the ANC and mass democratic movement representatives first met Ramushwana soon after his April takeover. But so far it has not met.

Contact with Lebowa's Nelson Ramodike has some history now, but activists complain of him trying to straddle the fence, pleasing both Pretoria and the ANC.

ANC activities in the region are also complicated by the new and varying forms of state control over the changing political dynamics. Lebowa police appear to have all but withdrawn from visible security tasks, and in their place has stepped the South African Defence Force (SADF). In July, soldiers moved into at least two villages in the Sekhukhuneland area, apparently at the request of unpopular chiefs worried about being usurped by ANC-aligned formations. And returned ANC leader John Nkadimeng addressed his hometown watched over by the military.

In Venda a more sophisticated political approach appears to be coming out of Defence Force headquarters—one of pre-empting radical action. The first of this kind was Ramushwana's government takeover in April. His denial of SADF involvement in the 'military coup' is a bit difficult to believe, with the seconded SADF brigadiers at Ramushwana's HQ [headquarters] undoubtedly having some hand in pulling the political strings.

At a more mundane level, local activists point to Ramushwana pre-empting a protest against an untidy township by launching his own clean-up campaign. He himself headed a clean-up team of the streets of Shayandima.

With resentment growing over the tribal councils blocking the efforts of village committees, Ramushwana has promised to disband them. He hoped the chiefs could hold ex officio positions in the new structures so they could 'learn about democracy'.

But the apparent drop in repression in Venda is being counter-balanced by the rise of a new Inkatha-lookalike, Maanda Nga U Pfana (unity is strength). Many of the old faces of the ousted Venda National Party (VNP) are in it. The facilities and organisations involved in training predominantly VNP youth in the past have been resuscitated—and reports of weapons-training are already filtering through.

Perhaps because white conservatism is so notorious in the region—where 97 percent of the population is black—the few efforts of white intervention of a more liberal flavour are particularly notable.

Some tentative reaching out to the ANC has already taken place. The Pietersburg Chamber of Commerce chief Jannie Moolman talks of chats with 'Thabo', the ANC's regional convenor, Thabo Makwenyane. Moolman's executive has approved a business trust to promote education and free enterprise within the black community.

And Northern Transvaal business is looking at bringing all business associations—black and white—into a regional grouping.

So the influences and interests impinging on the ANC and the region's political character are complex and many. While predictions are possible, it is too soon to know how the political situation will pan out. But for the moment, despite all the political energy, the Northern Transvaal gives an impression of a people holding its breath, waiting to see how volatile white fears feed off the new black militancy.—Africa Information Afrique



## Angola

### Diplomat Says Cuba Will Continue Assistance

MB1511093790 Luanda Domestic Service  
in Portuguese 0600 GMT 15 Nov 90

[Text] (Carlos Garcia Trapega), charge d'affaires at the Cuban Embassy in Angola, gave assurances in Luanda yesterday that his country's government is ready to continue to assist Angola in its economic and social development, even within the framework of implementing a multiparty system in the country.

Speaking at a press conference on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Angola and Cuba, the diplomat recalled that the development of cooperative ties between the two nations is based on principles of equality and mutual recognition and respect. He also said that the results of mutual cooperation over the past 15 years enable the two countries to make use of their potentials in order to achieve their noble objectives.

### Commentary Stresses Need for 'Reconstruction'

MB1411203290 (Clandestine) KUP in English to  
Southern and Central Africa 1911 GMT 14 Nov 90

[Commentary: "Peace Is Needed Above Everything Else in Angola"]

[Text] Jamba, Wed November 14 .....[dateline as received]—The political changes taking place in Angola have to be done within the framework of the specific historical conditions of Angola. History is not invented. History is what it is. It is not to be proved but to be told.

The Angolan situation is different from that of Cabo Verde [Cape Verde] and Sao Tome, for example.

In Angola, there is a situation of civil war which has been going on for the past 15 years, a war which opposes the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] elitist party, which, in 1975, as a movement, betrayed the Alvor Accords and usurped power with the support of Cuban forces on one hand, and UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola], the Angolan nationalist movement which enjoys the majority support of the Angolan people, on the other.

Taking this reality into account, the end of the war, peace, constitutes the condition without which any political and social changes cannot be successful within the context of the Angolan people's legitimate will. The so-called political, economic and social reforms which the MPLA intends to carry out will not have any substance without peace being established first. Furthermore, it is not up to the MPLA or the Government of the PRA [People's Republic of Angola] to make such reforms.

Our country will only be subjected to profound changes in the sequence of the development of the process leading to

multipartism, internationally verified free, and fair democratic elections with UNITA's active participation.

We should be realistic and coherent with the historical truth of our country. Let us put the interests of the country above all others, be they individual or group ones. The Angolan problem has to be solved within the context of the Angolan reality.

The day for the beginning of another round of direct negotiations between our movement and the MPLA or the PRA Government is drawing closer. The UNITA delegation will be in Portugal to once more contribute towards peace, which the Angolan people ardently desire. It will be in defence of the Angolan people that our movement's delegation to the talks will maintain a hand of fraternity, reconciliation and peace extended to the MPLA.

The hand of peace, because only peace can open up the doors to new steps which we all await on the path to multiparty democracy and national reconstruction. [sentence as received]

### \* First Shipment of Gasohol Arrives in Namibia

91AF0102E Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA  
in Portuguese 20 Sept 90 p 2

[Text] The ship "Petrangol" put into port on Tuesday [18 September] at the Namibian port of Luderitz with nearly 1.5 million liters of gasohol for the Republic of Namibia, the first sale of Angolan petroleum derivatives to that country.

This first export shipment of gasohol is the result of a recent contract between the National Angolan Fuel Company (Sonangol) and Shell Petroleum of Namibia, and it marks "historically" the beginning of trade contacts between the two countries in the area of petroleum.

The arrival of the ship at the small port of Luderitz, which is located 800 km south of Windhoek, was greeted by a multitude of more than 200 (between local leaders and curious onlookers) in the presence of the assistant minister of energy and mines, Helmut Angula, and representatives from Shell and from Angola.

The director of Shell Petroleum, Mike Hillis, declined yesterday [19 September] to reveal to ANGOP [Angolan Press Agency] the amount that this first transaction involves, alleging that there are trade norms which "should be respected in this type of business."

He said that preparations are now under way for a new shipment of gasohol to Namibia shortly, adding that "Shell hopes to increase the volume of purchases and increase cooperation with Sonangol."

In the ceremony which he called "a historical moment," he said: "Namibia's fragile economy cannot continue to share the burden of the oil embargo decreed by the United Nations against South Africa."

Namibia, which has been independent for just a little more than seven months now, is 100 percent dependent on South Africa with respect to petroleum derivatives.

"The arrival of this shipment means that we are about to realize our desire to diversify the sources of supply," he stressed, adding that many circles of society had nevertheless considered "our promise" in this sense to be mere rhetoric.

He stated that the arrival of the gasohol is also one of the components of the cooperation that exists between Angola and Namibia, and is the prelude to many other things that are going to happen.

"We hope that an uninterrupted supply will be guaranteed to us and that the short distance between Luanda and Luderitz will mean that the price will be competitive," he concluded.

When it came his turn, the first secretary of the Angolan Embassy in Namibia, Joao Baptista, stated that this trade cooperation is the continuation of the support that was offered by Angola in the liberation struggle of the Namibian people.

"We have walked together in the past in the struggle for the liberation of Namibia," he said, stressing that: "Now we will continue to walk together in the struggle for the economic independence of this young country and of southern African in general."

Meanwhile, as ANGOP was able to learn, officials from Sonangol are expected in the Namibian capital at any moment to formalize the delivery of gasohol and to set up new contacts with Shell.

#### \* Friendship Association Formed With France

91AF0102D Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA  
in Portuguese 15 Sep 90 pp 1, 8

[Text] The "France-Angola" Friendship Association was proclaimed yesterday [14 September] in Luanda in a ceremony held at the quarters of the Angolan League of Friendship and Solidarity with Nations (LAASP).

The president of the association, Angolan Fernando Franca Van-Dunem, minister of planning, stressed that the institution will promote friendly relations between France and Angola.

Franca Van-Dunem briefly reviewed the contributions of some Angolan nationals to the liberation of their country from their base in France, where they were pursuing their studies prior to national independence.

As a first measure, the president of the association asked for aid from the French Government for the restoration of the "Iron Palace" building, which is located in the lower section of the city of Luanda and was built based on a model of Gustave Eiffel.

The France-Angola Friendship Association will function under the aegis of the Angolan League of Friendship and Solidarity with Nations (LAASP).

Present at this ceremony were the secretary-general of the National Union of Angolan Workers, Pascoal Luvualu, France's ambassador to Angola, Stanislas Fil-liol, and the president of the LAASP, Coelho da Cruz, along with other guests.

#### \* Businesses Discuss Cooperation in Lisbon

91AF0102B Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA  
in Portuguese 20 Sep 90 p 2

[Text] On Tuesday [18 September] in Lisbon, Kiala Gabriel, the director of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, announced that more than 60 Angolan companies in the areas of ready-made apparel, fisheries, footwear, and the food industry will be opened up for competition to be privatized, beginning in the upcoming month of October.

Kiala, who was speaking at the opening of a round table on "Business Cooperation Between Portugal and Angola," invited the Portuguese businessmen to participate in this competition which is being organized by the Angolan government under the restructuring of the State-run business sector.

He further clarified the objectives and criteria of the restructuring of the State-run business sector, namely the adaptation of the State-run business sector to the strategic development objectives and the reorganization of State-run businesses in such a way as to make them efficient and profitable.

He explained that not only are the State-run businesses the targets of the restructuring, but also that the State shares in the business capital of any type of business that operates in the country.

Promoted by the Portuguese Industrial Association (AIP), nearly 200 Portuguese businesses were represented at the one-day seminar, most of which have interests in Angola.

As he inaugurated the round table, the Portuguese secretary of state for foreign affairs and cooperation, Durao Barroso, stressed that cooperation between the two countries (Angola and Portugal) is presently enjoying conditions that have never before existed due to the ardent political desire on the part of the two governments.

In another matter, he cautioned the Portuguese businessmen not to wait for peace before investing in Angola. He told them that they should do so now because, he said, afterwards it will be too late.

At his turn, the Portuguese secretary of state for finance, Elias Costa, defended the broadening of trade relations between Angola and Portugal at the conclusion of the round table.

Elias Costa went on to say that his government is planning to extend lines of credit that it has granted to Angola to investment and development projects, with a view toward a "stronger and more solid" cooperation between the two countries.

After describing the political relations between the executive branch in Lisbon and the government of Angola as "excellent," the Portuguese official stressed that economic relations have been developing satisfactorily.

However, various creditors from financial institutions connected with cooperative ventures pointed to the following as obstacles to investment in Angola: the current exchange rate policy, excessive bureaucracy, especially in foreign trade, and the fixing of prices administratively.

Participants at the conference were of the opinion that as long as the kwanza, the national currency, remains at the current level (including a 100 percent or 200 percent devaluation), the prospects offered by foreign investments in hard currency will be limited.

In addition to currency devaluation, some people spoke in support of guarantees regarding future adjustments in the exchange rate, liberalization of foreign trade, development of small- and medium-sized businesses, and priority participation of local entrepreneurs in the restructuring of the State-run sector.

In the opinion of the speakers at the conference, Portugal should carry out development activities with Angola instead of providing "emergency aid," including assuming the risks inherent in economic reforms.

"This is the right moment to invest decisively in Angola." This statement, which was made by one of the speakers, became the principal conclusion of the round table.

#### \* Religious Groups Allowed in Education

91AF0102A Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA  
in Portuguese 14 Sep 90 pp 1, 8

[Text] Yesterday [13 September], the Angolan minister of education, Augusto Lopes Teixeira, made the participation of religious groups and other "living forces" of society legal in the tasks of the official educational system for the present school year.

Lopes Teixeira gave this information to ANGOP [Angolan Press Agency] at the February 4 International Airport following his arrival from Geneva (Switzerland), where he participated from 3 September to 8 September in the 32nd international conference on "Problems in Education for All By the Year 2000."

Questioned about Angolan participation in the conference in Geneva, Lopes Teixeira said that he thought that it had been constructive and that it had served the purpose of "gaining experience" in the field of teaching.

Lopes Teixeira went on to say that in the present school year, the participation of religious groups and others [illegible text] carried out in the field of professional training and in the teaching of adults, but he stated that the Ministry of Education will maintain its leading role.

As the minister stated in the face of the current school explosion that is being registered in Angola, the party and the government have already equated some actions that will tend to decentralize the people's need in the field of education.

#### \* Closing of Some Unofficial Markets Announced

##### \* Official Lists Names

91AF0104A Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA  
in Portuguese 7 Sep 90 p 1

[Text] The Department of Markets, of the Luanda Provincial Commission, will shut down some markets in the capital that are not under its control, because they do not meet health and safety standards.

According to Manuel Ventura, chief of the Department of Markets, the markets to be shut down include the "Asa Branca" (Cazenga Municipality), Tinga Ngo (Rangel), and Corimba (Samba). The vendors will be transferred to the 15 markets controlled by the department of markets.

Asked when the stalls would be transferred, the official explained: "It is not easy to transfer personnel from one market to another, so we cannot name a fixed date."

According to Ventura, it will be necessary to conduct a program to educate the vendors, a program in which municipal and local commissions and mass organizations in the affected areas should take part.

He noted that the Calemba market was shut down on 29 January because of the outbreak of a large number of cholera cases and because of construction of the palace of culture.

"Even if the Ministry of Culture had not planned to build the future palace of culture there, we would have shut down the market, because, in the opinion of the doctors, it did not meet the standards of hygiene," he said.

It is noted that six of the 15 markets controlled by the Luanda Provincial Commission Department of Markets were built before independence; namely, the "Kinaxixi," Sao Paulo, Caputo, Bairro Popular, Prenda, and Cazenga I markets.

##### \* Decision Challenged

90AF0104B Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA  
in Portuguese 18 Sep 90 p 4

[Commentary by Emilio Te]

[Text] The Department of Markets, of the Luanda Provincial Commission, announced recently that it would



shut down some markets in this capital that are not under its control, because they do not meet health and safety standards.

The announcement came as a surprise to many people (both vendors and consumers) who daily buy and sell goods at the markets named by the department; notably, the "Asa Branca," in Cazenga Municipality, Tinga Ngo (Rangel), and the Corimba market (also known as the Imbondeira Square). Why not the "Roque" (located near the garbage dump), where conditions are similar, for example, to those of the "Asa Branca"?

The argument presented by the Luanda Provincial Commission was reasonable enough, considering that the sanitary conditions in these markets are not the best, but we cannot ignore the fact that hygiene and safety are notoriously lacking in the markets under state control.

When we consider certain specific and practical aspects, we agree with the department official when he says that it will not be easy to transfer personnel from one market to another, which is why no date has yet been set for shutting down said markets. Moreover, it will be necessary to conduct an education campaign among the vendors.

It is common knowledge that the 15 so-called state-controlled markets in Luanda are not sufficient to handle the burgeoning population in the capital city.

The "Kinaxixi," Sao Paulo (formerly Xamavo), "Caputo" (market of the Congolese), Bairro Popular, Prenda, and Cazenga I markets were established before independence, to serve the inhabitants during the colonial period, i.e., up to 1974, while others were built following independence.

The existence of unofficial markets in various municipalities of Luanda is in part the result of the lack of construction of new markets, which gave rise to the spontaneous appearance of the "parallel" markets, to handle the huge population migration to the capital.

However, this spontaneous appearance may also be laid to the disappearance of the commercial shops and cantinas, which at one time engaged in the retail sale of such items as palm oil, lamp oil, cornmeal, flour, and so on.

Why shut down the unofficial markets, instead of creating the conditions to build more official markets or improving sanitary and safety conditions? What has the Provincial Commission done or is it doing to eliminate the health and safety hazards in the "parallel" markets that emerged spontaneously because of the objective and subjective factors cited above?

For example, we can list some problems that were created with the elimination of the Calemba market, which has put immense pressure on the infrastructures of the "market of the Congolese" because of the excessive number of vendors who daily market their products there. There is not enough space for the large numbers of vendors and customers who flock there to buy their

goods. This is creating discomfort and is obviously causing some health and safety problems for the citizens.

Shutting down for the sake of shutting down is not the answer. Action should be taken "in situ" so that these markets may provide better service to the people—incidentally, the only ones adversely affected by this situation—within the standards that the Provincial Commission aims to impose.

Regarding the question of urbanization, which—in our opinion—should be the Commission's first consideration, all the municipalities in Luanda, based on the number of inhabitants, need one or even two official markets, located at strategic points where the population concentration is highest.

At this time, it would be more sensible not to eliminate the existing "parallel" markets until new structures are created to meet the needs of the population, so as not to thwart the activities of the vendors and even force them into unemployment.

Instead, we should improve conditions at the markets themselves, for example, by building permanent stalls (for protection against sun and rain), so as to maintain hygiene and safety standards.

#### \* Sonangol's Performance Discussed

91AF0101A Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA  
in Portuguese 18 Sep 90 p 2

[Interview with Sonangol Provincial Delegate Rafael Ingles by Correia Victor; date and place not given; first two paragraphs are JORNAL introduction]

[Text] In order for any corporation to be efficient in delivering services, organization is indispensable as a starting point. It is now generally recognized that, following the initial euphoria over the implementation of the SEF [Economic and Financial Reorganization], the program lapsed into apathy which was characterized by total stagnation, although some companies are completely lacking in the methods and measures advocated by this program.

With regard to the implementation of this program, we contacted the provincial delegate of Sonangol [National Angolan Fuel Company], who sketched out for us the company's situation in the province of Benguela.

[Victor] We would be grateful if you would first tell us how the company that you represent is structured.

[Ingles] The Lobito/Benguela Regional Company of Sonangol is a structure that is fundamentally geared toward the distribution of original products, fuels, lubricants, natural gas, and a large stock of the same products to supply the Province of Benguela, and transportation of same to the provinces of Huambo and Bie, as well as the resupplying to the deep-water terminals of existing fuels along the maritime coast.



To that end, the company has four installations, two of which are for fuels, natural gas and lubricants, respectively; and six divisions and two departments that carry out the tasks related to the movement of fuels and lubricants. One is for the movement of natural gas, another is for the maintenance and safeguarding of the company's assets, for administration and management of the company's budget, for the management of human resources, for the sales policy, quality control and product application control. These departments take care of all the company's activities and the physical protection of the general installations.

[Victor] Given the size of the company and considering the difficulties existing in our country today, how does one solve the problem of cadres?

[Ingles] We have a list of cadres coming from the former company and we are trying to recruit middle- and upper-level cadres of national scope. We have already available to us about ten who have middle-level training and one who has upper-level training. This latter one is responsible for the supervision of the deep-water terminal at Lobito. But these cadres are still not enough for optimum efficiency of work and structures.

[Victor] What are the numbers of the national work force, the foreign work force, and the specialized work force?

[Ingles] We have at our disposal nearly 680 national workers, five foreigners, about 10 middle-level technicians, and one chemical engineer.

[Victor] What are their working conditions?

[Ingles] We have a dining hall with the capability of providing 1,000 meals per day, a medical station in each of the installations, a consumer cooperative for everyday supplies, a cattle-raising farm to supply meat to the dining hall, a fish store, a fruit store and even complementary supplies that reach all the workers, benefitting each of them in accordance with the salary scale of each one.

There is also a Party Cell, a Youth Nucleus, and a representative from the OMA [Organization of Angolan Women], the Company Union, and the Labor Commission.

[Victor] What is the distribution system for fuels, lubricants and natural gas?

[Ingles] We try to accomplish that task through our resellers and directly to our large consumers who are located in the cities of Lobito and Benguela, with a total of 20 resellers for fuels and lubricants and 25 exclusively for natural gas. We also have a reseller in each of the province's municipalities.

[Victor] To what is the undependability of fuel distribution due?

[Ingles] This crops up most often when columns from other provinces arrive, and also as a result of the inadequacy of transportation for the timely supply of our positions. It becomes important to clarify that the truck

drivers are only allowed to fill up at depots. With regard to the supplementary drums, they are instructed to have access to our installations, which does not always occur.

[Victor] What are the biggest problems that the company faces in the area of natural gas distribution?

[Ingles] The inadequacy of transportation for the regular distribution to the resellers and distribution of natural gas in bulk to the factories and large institutions, added to the reduced number of vessels for an efficient rolling stock.

[Victor] What can you tell us about the great demand for natural gas and its shortage in the marketplace when the columns arrive?

[Ingles] It can be explained by the lack of transportation for those products to the delegations from Huambo and Bie. This gives rise to the great demand for those products by agents outside the corporate circle of Sonangol, causing speculation on the part of less honest businessmen.

Let it be understood that our products, fuels, and natural gas are delivered to the door of our customers, consumers, and resellers by means of our own transportation system, and we do not impose a surcharge for this delivery service.

[Victor] Could you talk to us about the goals that have been achieved in the fulfillment of the plans that have been worked out over the course of the past year?

[Ingles] Of the goals set for 1989, the following results were achieved: 73 percent for fuels, 38 percent for lubricants, and 11 percent for natural gas.

The reasons that the first two products fell short of their projected goals have to do with:

(a) Fuels: shortage of means of transportation by railway and highway; shortage of energy which reduced the consumption by existing companies in the areas of supply.

(b) Lubricants: total lack of packaging, drums, and vats, forcing them to be transported overland and in bulk, what little was furnished. It is worthwhile pointing out here that the packaging has always been obtained through a company in Luanda which is presently shut down due to the shortage of raw materials.

[Victor] How do you currently evaluate the company's economic and financial situation?

[Ingles] The situation is stable, in spite of the fact that our customers who buy on credit currently have overdue bills that added up, on 31 December 1989, to a total of 140 million kwanzas, with 94 percent of the State-owned firms depending on the General State Budget.

[Victor] I believe that I have exhausted my supply of questions. However, I would like to know what current relations between workers and management are like.

[Ingles] Our relations are good and the degree to which we know each other, but we are strengthening these relations.

[Victor] To conclude, tell us how internal cooperation is going among departments and sections.

[Ingles] In terms of the laws currently in effect, we have monthly management meetings in which coordinators of the Party Cell and the Secretariat of the Labor Union Commission also participate. There have been Workers' Assemblies during the course of which tasks are reviewed and the decisions made in the course of the management meetings are announced.

I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to stress that the company is developing its activities with objectives approved in the General Management Council at the central level and with direction from the top-level structure of the governor of the province.

The company is engaged in seeing to it that the SEF program becomes a reality, especially at the top-level orientations of the central government, and specifically in the improvement of fuel and petroleum supplies to the people, in rehabilitation of the supply posts, and opening up of new natural gas supply posts to the people, as well as the internal restructuring of the company, in compliance with the bill approved by the Council of Defense and Security on 12 June of the current year.

#### \* Catumbela To Be 'Alternate' Airport

91AF0101B Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA  
in Portuguese 7 Sep 90 p 2

[Text] The minister of transportation and communications, Antonio Paulo Cassoma, said on Wednesday [12 September] in Luanda that the Catumbela airport (27 km from Benguela) will be used as the alternate airfield for the February 4 Airport in Luanda.

In statements to ANGOP [Angolan Press Agency], Paulo Cassoma stressed that "it has been happening that a large number of airplanes, more than the runway can accommodate, have been arriving in Luanda, causing a long wait before the planes can land."

The Catumbela airport, which was built and used by the Cuban military mission, will be turned over to the National Air Navigation Company "ENANA" by the middle of this month.

"This will make it possible for those airplanes that find it impossible to land at the February 4 Airport to do so at Catumbela while they are waiting for an opening in the capital," said the minister.

Construction began in November of 1988 and was completed at the end of the first half of the past year, and the cost of the project came to \$41,680,279.

The first phase included the construction of the landing field, and the second, which is yet to be completed, will include the passenger terminal, cargo terminal, and other areas.

In other matters, Minister Cassoma stated that the Cabinda airport will soon be rehabilitated and the construction work, which will be financed by the American company Cabinda Gulf Oil Company, is budgeted at \$6,500,000. According to this government official, the provincial commissar of Cabinda, "ENANA," and Cabinda Gulf Oil Company are negotiating the project.

With this enlargement, the project will be equipped with a runway that is 3.5 km long and 45 meters wide, with a hangar, equipment for radio-aid, and illumination.

Currently the runway is 3,000 meters long and 30 meters wide.

Cabinda Gulf Oil Company is interested in the plan because bringing it into being will make it possible for larger airplanes to land, he said.

After completion of the construction work, the oil company believes that TAAG [Angolan Air Lines] will negotiate with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) the landing of long-range airplanes also in Cabinda where Cabinda Gulf operates.

### Lesotho

#### Lekhanya Pledges Support for New Monarch

MB1311060090 Maseru Domestic Service in English  
0500 GMT 13 Nov 90

[Text] The chairman of the Military Council and Council of Ministers, Major General Metsing Lekhanya, says the military government is fully prepared to cooperate and support His Majesty King Letsie III in performing his state duties. The chairman said this yesterday when addressing a press conference in Maseru after the swearing-in ceremony of the king and head of state, Letsie III.

Maj. Gen. Lekhanya said the Military Council and Council of Ministers will advise the king in all fairness and honesty for the sake of stability and tranquility in the country.

Asked what duties will be performed by the king, Maj. Gen. Lekhanya said His Majesty Letsie III will be a constitutional monarch who will, among others, perform state functions and assent to laws passed by the legislature and other mandated bodies. But most importantly, he indicated that the king will act as a unifying force with which all Basotho will identify, as a nation with its own traditions and customs. Maj. Gen. Lekhanya pointed out that the Basotho nation will have a chance to air their views about the monarchy in a referendum which will be held in 1992.

### King Moshoeshoe II Speaks on Military Council

MB1411133490 Johannesburg SAPA in English  
1212 GMT 14 Nov 90

[Text] London Nov 14 SAPA—The dethroning of Lesotho's King Moshoeshoe II and the swearing in of his eldest son as King Letsie III has tightened the grip of the allegedly South African-backed military rulers of the tiny mountain kingdom, according to a report in London on Wednesday.

In an interview with the liberal GUARDIAN newspaper, the deposed King Moshoeshoe said:

"This is a deceitful attempt to get a gullible world to believe that the military have normalised the situation ... In fact there is an intensification of the abuse of power and every day the principles of justice are violated and the principle of democracy is ignored."

According to the report, written by leading anti-apartheid journalist Victoria Brittain, King Moshoeshoe continued to be an embarrassment to President F.W. de Klerk after being forced into exile in March, by raising questions, during trips to Britain and the United States, about South Africa's "client government" in Lesotho.

"Pretoria has for 30 years been the dominant force in the politics of Lesotho. But in the early 80s the South African dominance was challenged by the rising influence of South Africa's own anti-apartheid struggles in the labour movement—half Lesotho's workforce are migrants in the South African mining industry. A South African-backed coup in 1986 brought Major-General Metsing Lekhanya to power. Confrontation was inevitable with King Moshoeshoe, who is highly educated and committed to democracy at home and dialogue with the liberation movement in South Africa."

Executive and legislative power was nominally vested in the king. "But in reality everything I wanted done was frustrated by the Military Council," King Moshoeshoe said. "The system of governance deteriorated, there were malpractices within the ruling circles, but my appeals for a code of conduct for leadership was simply too sensitive."

According to Ms Brittain, accusations of corruption and a scandal over the shooting of a student by Gen. Lekhanya in 1988 threatened to topple him, "but decades of close links with South African military chiefs and ministers made him a heavyweight whom the king could not match."

According to King Moshoeshoe, the release of ANC [African National Congress] leader Nelson Mandela in February this year was the beginning of the end.

"The Military Council refused to address the post-apartheid issues of the region. Our economy is completely integrated with South Africa's and I wanted a dialogue with the liberation movement about the future."

The solution had been his forced abdication.

King Moshoeshoe described the order introduced to the Lesotho Parliament by Gen. Lekhanya as "draconian—it denies any appeal against the order, the courts are excluded, the public is excluded. The Military Council has built a wall of immunity round itself."

"The constituent assembly's potential has been undermined by lack of civil liberties—they cannot organise their own meetings, or even address meetings without the Military Council's people on hand," King Moshoeshoe said.

### Mauritius

#### \* Trade Relations With Germany Discussed

91AF0169A Port Louis LE MILITANT MAGAZINE  
in French 13-14 Oct 90 pp 14-16

[Article signed S.P.: "New Germany: What Kind of Relations With Mauritius?"; first paragraph is LE MILITANT MAGAZINE introduction]

[Text] Since last Wednesday, 3 October, the FRG and the GDR are one: the new reunified Germany is now a reality. What does this mean for Mauritius? "Your exports to Germany should increase immediately by 20 to 25 percent," said Mr. Wolfgang Rieth, German consul general in Mauritius. Other barriers—to economy, trade, tourism and training—could also fall.

While Mauritius has had practically no economic relations with the GDR until now, it has formed very dynamic ties to the FRG since 1961.

A mere look at the latest figures will convincingly show it: from 1988 to 1990, the FRG granted Mauritius some DM [Deutsche mark] 75 million, i.e., about 715 million rupees, in loans and credits. Among the projects financed, we note DM47 million (351 million rupees) to purchase the Mauritius Pride, DM4.5 million (42.7 million) for the Rodrigues electric power project, DM 19.5 million (185 million rupees) for the Fort Victoria electric power plant, and DM9.5 million (90 million rupees) for the purchase of a tugboat.

In the past two years, Mauritius has also received a number of nonreimbursable gifts from the FRG, including DM5.7 million (54 million rupees) for environmental protection, and DM980,000 (9.3 million rupees) for the installation of windmills in Rodrigues.

#### Cooperation Between Companies

In addition to this financial collaboration negotiated between the two states, in recent years Mauritius and the FRG have also established relations at a second level, in particular between institutions. For instance, the DEG [German Development Company], a German financing and consulting institution whose purpose it is to promote cooperation between companies in Germany and in newly industrializing and developing countries, showed some interest for Mauritius in the past year. The DEG,



whose representative, Mr. Schoenfelder, visited Mauritius at the end of July, thus supplied nearly one-half of the capital for the Woventex project and acquired a large interest in the Maritim Hotel currently under construction. Another example of relations between institutions is the planned partnership between the German and Mauritian Chambers of Commerce. This could have very interesting repercussions for the Mauritian industry in Germany.

The Mauritian industry, we should point out, has already achieved a rather significant breakthrough on the German market, enabling Mauritius to have trade relations with Germany that tend to be greatly to our benefit. "Germany was not a major trade partner for Mauritius in the past. However, figures for the last three or four years show that trade relations between the two countries are more dynamic than Mauritius's relations with any other Common Market country, in that they have the highest rate of increase," the German consul general in Mauritius, Mr. Wolfgang Rieth, pointed out.

#### **Favorable Trade Balance**

With exports of about 1,272 million rupees, and imports of 902 million rupees, Mauritius's 1988 trade balance with Germany showed a surplus of 370 million rupees. From the FRG, Mauritius imports mainly machinery, chemicals and pharmaceuticals; it exports mainly textiles.

Actually, after France, Germany is the second-largest market for our textile free zone. "Considering that the German market suddenly increased by 16 million inhabitants, you can easily imagine now that Mauritian exports to Germany will increase immediately by at least 20 to 25 percent," Mr. Wolfgang Rieth estimated. "Formerly, the GDR was a separate market that would have required a special marketing organization. But now all retail companies and large chain stores in the FRG have opened or are about to open branches in East Germany," he went on. "Therefore, the contacts Mauritius already has in Germany will enable it to sell more right away. Mauritian firms will not have to incur additional marketing and access costs. The entire infrastructure is already there," the consul general pointed out. This opinion is shared by a member of the local Chamber of Commerce who also expressed "great optimism" concerning Mauritius's future exports to Germany.

#### **A Period of Adjustment**

Certainly, it will all depend on how long it takes not only for East Germany but also for Germany as a whole to adjust to the new deal, and on how fast they adjust. "Of course, we have every reason to rejoice, but we also know full well that the abolition of the former economic and social order on the present GDR territory amounts to an extraordinary challenge," Mr. Helmut Kohl, FRG chancellor, stated at the Bundestag (the German Parliament) on 23 August 1990, in his speech on the reunion of the GDR to the FRG. "The economic situation in the GDR is currently marked by the transition from a communist

planned socialist economy to a social market economy. Obviously, this will not be an easy transition. We cannot hope to wipe out 40 years of poor economic management at the expense of the GDR people within less than eight weeks after introducing monetary, economic, and social union. This cannot be done in a matter of days; on the contrary, it is a matter of months and years," Chancellor Kohl emphasized.

#### **What Kind of Competitiveness?**

Until now, however, things seem to be off to a rather fast start. For instance, over 2,800 joint companies with foreign participation were created in the GDR during the first half of 1990 alone. During the same period, at least 100,000 new companies were created in the GDR, in particular in the trade and craft sectors. In July alone, they were said to exceed a record 35,000. "There is much talk of trade with Germany, but we should take into consideration the fact that many new companies are being created there. In view of the East German labor capacity and relatively low cost, I do not know whether our products will be as competitive in the new Germany as they used to be on the FRG market," a free-zone manufacturer stated.

"People are under the impression that East Germany is a country that could supply products at an extremely low cost. That was true," Mr. Wolfgang Rieth added. "But now, with the introduction of the West German mark in East Germany, all salaries will be paid in that strong currency. This will automatically increase the cost of products manufactured in Germany. And it is to be feared that many East German industries that used to be competitive will no longer be competitive at Common Market level. East Germany, which was one of the most dynamic CEMA members, will also lose some markets in the East, as trade relations will increasingly be settled in strong currencies. Therefore, I think that East Germany will have to go through a period of adjustment of two to three years," the consul general stated.

#### **Scholarships and Training**

Another area of relations between Germany and Mauritius is that of training. From 1961 to 1988, 168 scholarships amounting to DM2 million (19 million rupees) were granted to Mauritians. In addition to the five free scholarships offered each year to meet local priorities, two years ago the FRG launched a program which, every year, enables three Mauritians to go and study German for three years at the Antananarivo University, after which they are sent to Germany for two practice periods of three months each. According to Mrs. Nicole Rieth, the German vice consul, about 800 Mauritian students take up German each year. "And the demand keeps increasing, in particular in the hotel sector," she pointed out.

In addition, under an agreement signed last week, Germany will send three experts to train Mauritian instructors for the Industrial and Vocational Training Board



(IVTB), from 1 December 1990 to 30 November 1992. "These will be integrated experts, which means that Mauritius will pay their salaries according to the local salary scale, and the remainder will be paid by a German organization, the Center for International Migration and Development (CIM)," Mrs. Rieth explained.

#### Germans on Vacation

"Ferien [Vacations] in Mauritius." Apart from the business side, human relations between Mauritius and Germany take place also, and above all, at tourism level. "Vacations in Mauritius" appears to be a successful slogan in the FRG. In 1989, our island welcomed 18,000 German tourists. The figure has steadily increased in recent years, with the direct result that, in October 1989, Air Mauritius increased its flights to Germany from two to four per week.

Can Mauritius now expect to find favor with the former East Germans? "The moment the wall opened the East Germans showed their eagerness to travel by immediately visiting West Berlin, the French Riviera, Italy, and other European countries," Mr. Wolfgang Rieth emphasized in a speech delivered last 3 October at a reception organized in Port Louis to celebrate the German reunification. "They probably will not be able to afford it right away, but they will certainly look for the exotic surroundings that they could not find until now during their vacations in other East European countries," the consul general went on.

Conversely, the German consulate general receives each month about 150 visa applications from Mauritians wishing to go to Germany, on vacation or on business. These visas are valid only for up to three months. "As far as businessmen are concerned, we intend to simplify the procedure in the very near future, to enable them to get a visa in one day instead of one week as is now the case," Mrs. Rieth announced.

#### Diplomatically Yours

This brings up the question of German diplomatic representation in Mauritius. Are changes to be expected? Until now, the GDR ambassador accredited to Mauritius was based in Dar es Salaam, and the FRG has had a consulate in Mauritius since 1961. The present consul general, Mr. Wolfgang Rieth, was appointed on 28 November 1989, and Mrs. Nicole Rieth had been working at the consulate as vice consul since 1980. In 1983, the FRG representation was upgraded from honorary consulate status to that of consulate general. The consulate is supervised by the embassy based in Antananarivo which, starting in 1988, has increased its presence in Mauritius; the ambassador now stays on our island one week every month.

"The government remains the same, the organizations remain the same, nothing has changed for Germany. It is just that GDR representations will be closed. The West German policy will remain the same," Mr. Wolfgang Rieth stated. This echoed his speech of last 3 October, in which

he stated unequivocally: "Today the GDR has ceased to exist. The decision to join [the FRG], which reflected the wish of the majority of the East German people, was already made on 23 August in East Berlin by a freely elected people's assembly. From now on, there is only one German parliament, the Bundestag, which was joined today by 144 additional deputies from the East. There is also only one government, the Bonn government."

On 2 December 1990, Germany will hold new elections which, in a way, will finalize its reunification. The new Germany will be stronger and, for many, more to be feared. "Achtung!" [Watch out], some say, a new monster is in the making. "Everybody's objective should be to put an end to the 40-year division that existed in Germany and to institute democracy in one country," Mr. Wolfgang Rieth answered to these fears. "Reunification took place with a large consensus from neighboring countries. Germany, which is now the largest country in the European community, if we look at its population, will bring about rapid expansion within the Community. This will also indirectly benefit other countries associated with the European Community, including Mauritius. Thus, any case against reunification based on assumptions rather than facts is the responsibility of those who make such a case." Firmly, but with a smile. Like the new Germany.

#### Mozambique

##### Chissano Swears in Newly Appointed Officials

MB1411143090 Maputo Domestic Service  
in Portuguese 1030 GMT 14 Nov 90

[Text] President of the Republic Joaquim Chissano swore in Lieutenant General Hama Thai as deputy national defense minister and Filipe Mandlate as secretary of state for social action at a joint ceremony held at the Ponta Vermelha Palace in Maputo this morning.

Present at the ceremony were the minister of national defense, the minister in the Presidency, ministers of interior and health, Mozambique Armed Forces' officers, and officials from the Ministry of Health.

Speaking at the ceremony, President Chissano said that it is only proper that the chief of General Staff should also be deputy minister to enable him to be closely linked with the activities of the Ministry of National Defense and have a clear understanding of government's work. The Mozambican head of state said a new responsibility for Lieutenant General Antonio Hama Thai will enable him to perfect his work in the Mozambique Armed Forces General Staff.

The president of the Republic also said that Filipe Mandlate will henceforth lead an extremely important sector under the present national situation. This is not only because of war but because the State Secretariat for Social Action is a sector which demands great attention.

President Chissano said social action had so far been part of Health Ministry which under the present situation also requires great attention. He pointed out that social action is a sector that requires the cooperation of all state sectors and all social forces in the country.

President Chissano named the following as some of the tasks of the State Secretariat for Social Action: to encourage, assist, and coordinate initiatives with a view to assisting the needy.

The Mozambican head of state said that the fact that the activity of the State Secretariat for Social Action is mainly directed to assisting the most vulnerable, it should not be viewed as a sector that was created just because of the emergency situation caused by war. He said vulnerable people have always existed in Mozambique suffering from adversities of climate, economy, and war. The president of the republic said that vulnerable people do not fall under any particular ministry or organized structure. As such, the newly created State Secretariat for Social Action would greatly take care of them.

Chissano also said the good work of the State Secretariat for Social Action would indirectly benefit other government sectors. He said the secretariat will assist the physically handicapped and widows unable to take care of abandoned children who are a potential human force for the country's development.

#### **Delegates Criticize Union, Cost of Living, State**

*MB1511131090 Maputo in English to Southern Africa  
1115 GMT 15 Nov 90*

[From "Outlook Africa" Program]

[Text] Delegates at the Second National Conference of the Organization of Mozambican Workers which opened in Maputo on Monday [12 Nov] continued their discussions today with a debate on the new strategies of the union movement.

Yesterday, the delegates debated the report delivered to the conference by the organization's leadership. Many of them angrily denounced victimization by some management of trade union activists in the factories, as you can hear in the following report telexed by the Mozambique News Agency:

One delegate, Jose Masila, said instead of observing the legal norms, employers were acting unjustly against trade unionists, particularly against the secretaries of trade union committees. He said the employers claim that the trade union secretaries are responsible for the workers' demand or for the strikes. Mr. Masila called on the government to guarantee trade union committees immunity when they are acting within the law.

The general secretary of the Organization of Mozambican Workers, OTM, Augusto Macamo, pointed out that the law already protects trade union rights and that it is

illegal for employers to victimize trade unionists. He said it was necessary to find mechanisms to ensure that the law is enforced. Mr. Macamo called on workers to show solidarity with local trade union leaders who are victimized. He gave the example of the trade union secretary at the state company Geomoc which is involved in drilling wells who was unjustly sacked. The workers fought to reinstate him and paid his wages for eight months. Eventually, he was readmitted and it was the Geomoc director instead who was dismissed.

Access of OTM members for training courses inside and outside the country led to some controversy. Delegate Joao Sebastiao claimed that the selection of OTM activists to attend courses was biased in favor of Maputo. Does the OTM only need trained personnel in Maputo. What about the other provinces, he asked. He even alleged that bribery was involved in the selection of those attending courses abroad.

Mr. Macamo denied that the OTM leadership was favoring Maputo above the rest of the country and said that allegations of bribery would be investigated.

Repeatedly delegates criticized the high cost of living resulting from the World Bank- and IMF-supported economic recovery program under implementation since 1987. Samuel Matsinhe, general secretary of the food and beverage workers' union described the current level of prices as intolerable. He called on the government to readjust wage levels. He said that prices have been liberalized but wages are still (?chained) and he demanded that wages should also be liberalized.

Delegates were angered at the failure of the state to take action to force employers to obey labor laws and health and safety regulations. One delegate, Amadeu Pedro said the state has the power to impose its laws and it does so in cases such as the law on compulsory military service, but when the law defends the interests of the workers, the state is not interested in knowing whether it is respected or not.

Another delegate, Ahmadi Adamo asked how the OTM would fair in the future when it might have to compete with other trade union federations. He pointed out that the country's new Constitution which comes into force at the end of this month allows the formation of other trade union centers. He said that so far OTM membership only covered 56 percent of the country's wage labor force. To recruit more members, he said, the OTM should be more flexible and dynamic.

However, another delegate, Samuel Matsinhe, expressed strong opposition to an attempt to set up a second trade union center, saying that dividing the trade union movement would only bring weakness and hinder the workers' struggle.

### Finance Minister Announces Credit 'Restraint'

MB1411143290 Maputo Domestic Service  
in Portuguese 1030 GMT 14 Nov 90

[Text] Over the next year, Mozambique's monetary policy will continue to emphasize monetary and credit restraint in line with plans to curb inflation.

Chairing the seminar on the country's economic and social reality in light of the new Constitution, Bank of Mozambique Governor Eneias Comiche stated that interest rates cannot be lower than the inflation rate. Estimates suggest that inflation next year may run at 20 percent.

Turning to the issue of foreign exchange policy, Bank of Mozambique Governor Eneias Comiche explained that its goals continue to be as follows: to reduce administrative control over the allocation of foreign currency, and to narrow the gap between the exchange rates in the official and parallel markets, in an attempt to influence the latter.

Speaking during yesterday's debate on fiscal policy, Deputy Finance Minister Boaventura Cossa announced that technical subsidies paid in foreign currency to specialized cadres will be included in their salaries from next year. Deputy Finance Minister Boaventura Cossa explained that this move fits within the broad framework of efforts to revalue the metical, Mozambique's national currency.

Deputy Finance Minister Boaventura Cossa also disclosed that one of the priorities for next year will be to improve the process of recovering taxes from foreign workers in Mozambique. He noted that the mechanisms currently used for that purpose are far from effective, thereby allowing many foreigners to dodge taxes.

### Trade Minister Comments on PTA Upon Departure

MB1411143890 Maputo Domestic Service  
in Portuguese 1030 GMT 14 Nov 90

[Text] Mozambican Trade Minister Daniel Gabriel arrived in neighboring Swaziland on 13 November. Trade Minister Daniel Gabriel is holding meetings in the Kingdom of Swaziland in preparation for a summit of heads of state of Preferential Trade Area (PTA) member countries. Speaking to Radio Mozambique shortly before leaving Maputo yesterday, Minister Daniel Gabriel said that summit is scheduled for 23 and 24 November.

[Begin Gabriel recording] Issues in the agenda of the meeting include discussions on a timetable for PTA member countries to reduce customs tariffs. One of the ways to promote trade among southern African countries will therefore be to reduce customs tariffs.

This is one of the problems to come under discussion. The issue of regional transportation, including route links, will also be discussed. The agenda of the meeting also includes discussions of other fields, notably [words indistinct] industry, agriculture, and health.

However, trade and the reduction of customs tariffs will be the main items in the agenda of the meeting. [end recording]

### Namibia

#### Nujoma Announces Measures To Protect Waters

MB1511150490 Johannesburg Domestic Service  
in English 1100 GMT 15 Nov 90

[Text] The Namibian Government is to buy navy patrol boats and helicopter gunships soon to protect its territorial waters.

This was announced by President Sam Nujoma who strongly condemned the violation of Namibian waters by Spanish fishing boats. President Nujoma warned that his government would not hesitate to take punitive action against any country or individual violating Namibia's integrity.

#### Lifting of U.S. Sanctions Against Nation Urged

MB1511150290 Umtata Capital Radio in English  
1400 GMT 15 Nov 90

[Text] Namibia's prime minister has appealed for the lifting of United States sanctions against his country. Hage Geingob says Namibia has made representations to the United States, stating that the country is now free, and should not be made to suffer under sanctions imposed against South Africa.

Geingob said he understood [words indistinct] legislation in the United States, stressing that Namibia was a young democracy that needed American support.

### Swaziland

#### Police, Army Beat Boycotting University Students

MB1511083390 Mbabane THE TIMES OF  
SWAZILAND in English 15 Nov 90 p 1

[Report by Gordon Mbuli: "CLOSED! Cops Move in on Students with Truncheons"]

[Text] The Kwaluseni Campus of the University of Swaziland was closed indefinitely yesterday after a three day class boycott.

An order closing the university, gave the students 30 minutes within which to vacate the campus.

The order, signed by the University registrar Dr. Walter Sukati, was made shortly after 5 p.m. [1500 GMT].

Student who did not seem to believe the order, huddled together at the university library, but shortly after 5:30, paramilitary police wielding truncheon sticks, moved in and later waded into the students.

Eye witnesses said the police and army charge drove the students toward the gates.

About 300 of the estimated 1,400 students enrolled at the university, are believed to have been injured, some of them seriously, after they were hit by the police while others were kicked.



The students were chased, some, as far as the Matsapha Shopping Centre almost a kilometre away.

The majority of students ran out of the university in what they were wearing at the time.

The university was ordered closed after students defied a second order to return to class by 10 O'clock [0800 GMT] yesterday morning.

But the striking students continued to loiter around the campus as they waited for the outcome of an urgent application they made to the High Court for an order restraining the University Council from closing the campus.

There were expressions of joy shortly after the 4 p.m. when the students heard that the High Court granted an order in their favour.

However, the order only called upon the University Council to show cause why they should not be restrained from closing the University. However, Mr. Justice Francis Rooney declined to restrain the university administration from closing the campus between yesterday and November 23 when the order is returnable.

The joy was short lived when armed police officers moved in, ordering them out by 5.30 p.m.

It appeared that many of the students were not aware of the memorandum ordering them out of the university by 5.30 p.m.

The majority of the students saw the memo which was placed outside the administration block shortly after 5 p.m. when they rushed to lock themselves inside the library.

### **Zambia**

#### **Choma Court Adjourns Opposition Trial**

*MB1411160890 London BBC World Service in English  
1515 GMT 13 Nov 90*

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] It has been a bit quieter today in the town of Choma, in southern Zambia. There were riots there

yesterday at the court house when a crowd protested over police action in connection with the trial of nine members of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy.

The trial continued today with three of the accused, including Frederick Chiluba, head of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions, ZCTU, giving evidence on the events of 16 October, when they were alleged to have held an unlawful meeting and their evidence was in marked contrast to that of police detectives, as Mike Hall reports from Choma.

[Begin Hall recording] The evidence given by the police officers under cross examination this morning appeared weak and on several occasions sent the court into eruptions of laughter. In the witness box, Mr. Frederick Chiluba said the police evidence was the continuation of the distortion and [word indistinct] that had gone on since he was charged. He said the officer in charge of Choma police station had demanded the accused make statements about the subject matter of the alleged unlawful meetings and said they would be at the police station all night if they refused to cooperate. The police deny this.

Several other contradictions between the story given by the police and the accused were [three-second break in transmission] whether the statements were made in the presence of a witness.

Hundreds of people again crowded around the tiny courtroom and listened intently to the proceedings as heavily armed riot police stood by, keeping their distance so as not to provoke a repeat performance of yesterday's disturbances.

This afternoon, the Registrar of Societies appeared in court and said that the Movement for Multiparty Democracy was an illegal society but, under cross examination, he was also asked whether UNIP [United National Independence Party], the ruling party, was an illegal organization as it had failed to fulfill two requirements of the law: To submit annual returns and to make a note of the change of office bearers. He was unable to answer this question. The trial was adjourned until 10 January next year. [end recording]



## Ghana

### Regional Fora on Democracy End; Results Viewed

AB1311211490 Accra Domestic Service in English  
1300 GMT 10 Nov 90

[Text] The series of regional public forums on evolving a new democratic process planned for the 10 regional capitals have finally come to an end. They were organized by the National Commission for Democracy [NCD] to seek the views of Ghanaians on the evolution of a true democratic system. Our correspondent, Walter Dzokoto, who covered the seminars, has this report on the final seminar at Wa.

[Begin Dzokoto recording] On assumption of office, the PNDC [Provisional National Defense Council] made its intention clear to Ghanaians and the entire world that it is committed to the establishment of a truly democratic system, one in which decision making would not be restricted to a few individuals, but would involve people from all walks of life and at all levels of the social structure. The government also made it clear that true democracy, devoid of instability, can only be (possible) with a strong economic base.

It is against this background that the National Commission for Democracy was established to oversee the realization of this objective. Various memoranda were submitted to the commission by individuals and organizations in this regard. This culminated in the establishment of the district assembly concept and structures below it. The conclusion of the regional forums is just another attempt by the NCD to get Ghanaians involved in carving out a democratic system that will not end after voting but will guarantee the people's continuous participation in the decisionmaking process as well as to meet their economic and sociocultural aspirations. The most important issues that were tackled included the form and content of what type of democratic arrangement to be put in place for the future government of the country. Political and economic stability were among the issues that received serious attention, because politics and economics are inseparable in view of the consequences each has on the other.

One major consensus that emerged was the strengthening of the district assembly concept to enable it to function efficiently as a solid local political and administrative authority. The need for an elected national assembly with an executive president was also agreed upon. Sharp differences, however, emerged on its composition and whether it should be under multiparty, or nonparty system. Majority view was, however, for nonparty system. On political instability, divergent views were expressed. While others strongly advocated that the military be given the chance to take active part in politics, others held the view that fair distribution of national resources, adherence to the principle of probity and accountability, as well as the tolerance of opposing views would be enough to guarantee stability.

Participants also recognized the need for a reasonable transitional period to allow for effective implementation of whatever concept it agreed upon. On the whole, the maturity, sincerity, and openness that was demonstrated by the National Commission for Democracy and government officials throughout in spite of serious provocations is an indication that the PNDC really means business.

Apart from the open forum, interested Ghanaians who could not attend, continue to submit memoranda to the various offices of the National Commission for Democracy. [end recording]

### Secretary Launches ECOWAS Travel Documents

AB1411180290 Dakar PANA in English  
1633 GMT 14 Nov 90

[Text] Accra, 14 Nov. (GNA/PANA)—Ghana Wednesday became the second country after Niger to launch the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) travelling document which will be valid for travel in the sub-region. Foreign Secretary Obed Asamoah, who launched the 32-page document in Accra, said it is not a substitute for international passports. It is to enable nationals of ECOWAS countries, as distinct from those of other countries, to be accorded such privileges and facilities as would enhance the economic, social and cultural integration, he said.

He said the document is to replace such travel documents as travel certificates, national identity cards and letters of introduction used for travel by some nationals within the community which often create confusion and misunderstanding for security officials. Asamoah said the introduction of the document is an attempt to secure uniformity of the document which can easily be recognized and accepted by all member states. It is also in conformity with the ECOWAS Treaty which calls for the freedom of movement and residence of citizens of member-states. The document has a life-span of four years with the option of renewal after the first two years. Its cover is light blue for all the 16-member states. The only difference is that of the name of the issuing country which is printed on the front cover.

## Guinea

### President Urges Expatriates To Return Home

AB1411105890 Libreville Africa No. 1 in French  
0730 GMT 11 Nov 90

[Text] The Guinean president has reacted to the announcement of the creation in Paris of the Rally of the Guinean People, a party founded by Alfa Conde, one of the opponents in exile. President Lansana Conte said the party could not be considered as a political party, so long as various groupings aspiring to become political parties have not yet been legalized. The Guinean president, who was addressing a press conference, stated that he was determined to establish a multiparty political system in

his country, but felt the system would accommodate two parties initially, before others could be accepted. According to President Conte, Alfa Conde can only be credible if he comes to Guinea to introduce himself to his compatriots. Let us hear what he said:

[Begin Conte recording] He came here [words indistinct]. He is not the only one. All those who created parties abroad have returned home. They continue to come and leave without hindrance. I do not know what he wants, but a party that must govern Guinea cannot operate outside. I am asking all Guineans to come to Guinea and work for Guinea. It is while they are here that they can hold discussions with their brothers, not elsewhere. [end recording]

### **Conte Leaves for Cuba**

*AB1411155290 Paris AFP in French 0926 GMT  
14 Nov 90*

[Text] Conakry, 14 Nov (AFP)—Guinean President Lansana Conte left Conakry today for Cuba on a four-day official working and friendly visit, it was announced in the Guinean capital. The Guinean head of state is accompanied by his wife Henriette, Ibrahima Sylla, planning and cooperation minister, and Madigbe Fofona, public health minister.

General Conte, who is visiting Cuba for the first time since he came to power in 1984, will hold discussions with Cuban President Fidel Castro on bilateral cooperation and the Nonaligned Movement, it was learned from Guinean sources. Conte will return to Conakry on 18 November.

### **Ivory Coast**

#### **Paper Comments on PDCI Succession Strategy**

*AB1411195690 Abidjan LE NOUVEL HORIZON  
in French 12 Nov 90 p 3*

[Borris Lathe editorial entitled: "Succession-Part I"]

[Text] The Democratic Party of Ivory Coast [PDCI] wanted to make us believe that it never indulges in insults but you cannot teach an old dog new tricks. After reading stupid remarks of a "distant cousin" of the Ivorian Popular Front [FPI] leader which appeared in 27 October FRATERNITE MATIN and listening to the televised babbling of Interior Minister Leon Konan Koffi on 30 November, it is common knowledge that PDCI was fantasizing.

One can understand Gbagbo's "distant cousin," the handyman of Mr. Usher Assouan, the mayor of Cocody. He is merely looking for his daily bread. One can also understand Leone Konan Koffi. He took great pains only to record mediocre results. He even ended up discrediting the PDCI and its leader. Through badly organized cheating—a sign of incompetence—he demonstrated

before everybody's eyes that Houphouet-Boigny no longer has control over legitimate power.

Yet Messrs. Leone Konan Koffi and Gbagbo agree on the fundamental issue, namely, Houphouet is old and he must relinquish power. The interior minister, like most PDCI dignitaries, think that succession should take place in the form of inheritance, that the outgoing Houphouet designates his successor. The scenario has been mounted without any tribalistic ulterior motives, only for this new elected person to be Henri Konan Bedie. This is the fifth time the Ivorian Constitution has been tampered with.

Let us open a parenthesis and say that this scenario within the PDCI itself tickles people like Philippe Grogroire Yace, thrown out of the race in 1980; Emmanuel Dioulo, disqualified since the General Export-Import Company affair; and Osei Gnansou, the "unwanted man." In this circle, the poorer your memory, the better you live.

So contrary to Mr. Leon Konan Koffi, Laurent Gbagbo and all parties of the democratic left think that the people must choose Houphouet-Boigny's successor through the electoral process. Moreover, they have done so by giving their votes to the FPI leader. However Laurent Gbagbo and the left upset the system designed for one (political) family to perpetuate its stay in power.

The people of Ivory Coast aspire for change. In view of the difficulties of the times, they want men of rigor to manage public affairs. They want political officials who make choices according to the people's needs and not along ethnic lines.

The people of Ivory Coast have never been tribalistic (the real results of the presidential elections demonstrate this) nor xenophobic, but the PDCI leadership pretends to have no knowledge of this as it continues to rule as in the past.

#### **Gbagbo's Letter Addresses Citizens on Elections**

*AB1411153290 Abidjan LE NOUVEL HORIZON  
in French 12 Nov 90 p 10*

[Text] Fellow Ivorians, dear countrymen: Presidential elections were held on 28 October 1990. The historical significance of these elections escaped nobody because since our country's independence this was the first time that the electorate had to choose between two candidates from different political organizations. Now it is time for us to draw lessons from these elections and to get organized for the political prospects in the country in the weeks ahead.

The 28 October presidential elections concretely established Ivorians adherence to political pluralism and their firm commitment to strengthening democracy in the country. The unprecedented mobilization of our countrymen during the campaign and their sustained interest and contributions that kept the debate alive go a long way to prove the point. I would like to pay tribute to the

people of Ivory Coast for this commitment to building a truly free and democratic Ivorian society. The fact that the chairman of the Democratic Party of Ivory Coast—African Democratic Rally [PDCI-RDA] reluctantly proclaimed the introduction of the multiparty system, only to subsequently go to great lengths to deprive it of its real content, must be denounced in the strongest terms possible. He in fact:—rejected every possibility of dialogue with the other parties on the condition for a smooth transition to the multiparty political system;—tried to make people believe the idea of a plot organized by the opposition parties;—authorized the repression of opposition demonstrations when those of his own party were being motivated and encouraged;—confiscated, to his exclusive advantage, the state media until the campaign opened.

Furthermore, on the occasion of the presidential elections he:—announced the retention of the 1985 electoral code and hastily adopting new provisions geared at creating monetary barriers in front of candidates;—allowed the elections to be organized offensively, characterized by all sorts of uncouth rigging methods;—embarked on a wave of arrests of citizens from whom attempts are being made to squeeze out confessions on an alleged existence of arms being kept somewhere in preparation for a so-called plot by the Ivorian? Popular Front [FPI].

The Ministry of Interior's dumbfounding declaration of the results—when these were still considered partial results—perfectly demonstrates the partisan use to which the PDCI put the state machinery during these presidential elections. For the Ivorian electorate, this created the impression of a real political holdup, which brought along skepticism and frustration.

In the face of maneuvers aimed at crudely misrepresenting the expression of the people's will, the FPI—acting with evidence—will use all legal channels to secure the cancellation of the 28 October 1990 election. Furthermore, our party solemnly reaffirms that its line of conduct is to conquer political power through the ballot box. Hence, it is determined to continue the fight to establish a democratic Ivorian society and will oppose any attempts by the leader of the PDCI to bring the current experience to a halt by putting forward, as was the case in the past, imaginary plots.

The 25 November 1990 parliamentary elections constitute for all Ivorians a new significant stage in the fight for freedom and democracy. I call on all Ivorians to seize this opportunity to forcefully mark their increasing involvement in the choice of the country's directions and to see to it, at all levels, that these elections do reflect their will as much as possible.

As for the activists of the FPI, a truly vanguard party in the fight for building Ivory Coast, these elections provide the occasion to seize new Bastilles. I exhort them not to give in to intimidation, and drawing on the lessons of the

presidential elections, to mobilize themselves massively to conquer a significant representation in the next assembly for our party.

To all, I reiterate my unswaying confidence in the ability of Ivorians to peacefully build a society of freedom, progress, and justice. [Signed] Laurent Gbagbo, secretary general of the FPI

## **Liberia**

### **NPFL Claims Nigerian Planes Bomb Buchanan**

*AB1411212090 London BBC World Service in English  
1709 GMT 14 Nov 90*

[From the "Focus on Africa" program]

[Text] According to Charles Taylor's rebel Liberian National Patriotic Front, ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group] forces have again attacked the rebel-held port of Buchanan. They say aircraft bombed it today and that an American ship in the harbor was also hit. On the line to Washington, Robin White asked Patriotic Front defense spokesman, Tom Woewiyu, what, according to him, had happened.

[Begin recording] [Woewiyu] The port of Buchanan was hit by two aircraft from the Nigerian Air Force, and a ship that was in port unloading food and drugs was hit. And this ship belongs to an American company I believe. The ship was bringing in food through the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres.

[White] Was anybody killed or injured?

[Woewiyu] Yes we have confirmed that people were killed in the city of Buchanan and a lot of people were injured, and also this particular boat was destroyed.

[White] Were people on the boat hit?

[Woewiyu] I believe so, yes.

[White] Presumably the intention of the raid was to hit your military positions.

[Woewiyu] Robin, we do not have military positions for anyone to hit. This is a people's war. Everybody in Liberia is prepared to fight. Everybody in Liberia, under the auspices of the National Patriotic Front, is a soldier in himself. We don't have a military target to hit, and I believe that Nigeria, Ghana, and all of these people that claim to have tried to bring us help know that the port of Buchanan is not a military target. We are not bringing in arms through there, and it is just a senseless destructive act on the part of these people. That has nothing to do with a military target.

[White] Have you managed to find out what the owners of the American vessel think of what happened?

[Woewiyu] Well I believe right now there are people on the phone with the U.S. State Department trying to find



out why because I think assurance has been given before by the ECOMOG people that they were not going to do this kind of senseless destruction. But I am sure we will hear more about this from other sources. [end recording]

### ECOWAS Role After Abortive Summit Viewed

AB1411163890 Paris VOIX D'AFRIQUE  
in French Nov 90 p 4

[Sigue Boureima Jeremie article: "The Impotence of ECOWAS"]

[Text] Unless care is taken, the Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS] as a community could undergo serious division as a result of the Liberian civil war. The failure of the emergency summit of ECOWAS heads of state before it even happened should be seen and analyzed as a warning signal.

Slated for the first half of October in Yamoussoukro, Houphouet-Boigny's hometown, to reconcile all contradictions generated by the Liberian crisis, the meeting could not be held owing to lack of participants. The heads of state of Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia—who contributed troops to the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group [ECOMOG] and who met in August in Banjul—seem to have applied against their elder colleague the principle of reciprocity which could turn out to be injurious to the credibility and life of the institution.

A vast economic and political entity which breathes by letter rather than by spirit, is ECOWAS—through the evil spell of this meeting which never took place—going to experience its first moral crisis? By getting deeply and almost subjectively involved through ECOMOG, the institution has created and developed the objective conditions for a break in consensus. At any rate, beyond the arguments advanced by Mr. Dawda Jawara who, as current ECOWAS chairman, believed that the convening of such a summit came within his purview, the institution is already facing the danger of a split.

The actors of the Banjul summit, in order to stress the toughness of their personality and protect their public image, were probably not wrong in refusing to make the Yamoussoukro trip. However the fact remains that by so doing they completely ignored the sacred status of elderliness which age confers on the Ivorian president, something which, alas, sends us miles away from the substratum of African culture. Respect for the elderly, whatever our level of acculturation, still remains one of the strong foundations of the specificity of African culture.

It is true that having not done the minimum expected by sending a delegation to the Banjul summit, the "Old Man" was embarking on a major political and diplomatic risk by calling a summit in Yamoussoukro. Furthermore, his benevolence toward Liberian refugees—for obvious reasons of humanitarianism, geography, and consanguinity—probably contributed to the refusal of

some of his peers to go to the Ivorian capital. Could it be that denials by Abidjan of any involvement in the Liberian tragedy failed to convince people? In any case, this debate seems to have outlived its relevance today since ECOMOG has never stopped behaving like the armed wing of the factions fighting against Charles Taylor.

All said and done, the moral strength of ECOWAS may once more be tested as a result of this abortive Yamoussoukro summit, and this will probably be prejudicial to finding a political solution.

Truly speaking, in this crisis, the personal equation of the mediators has never been absent from their approaches, thus rendering more improbable and more confused all the opportunities for a settlement. ECOMOG, landed exclusively from all other business in Monrovia, is increasingly behaving more like an occupation force than a peacekeeping instrument. Has it been driven that far by the realities in the field?

One thing remains certain: The spirit of partiality has virtually rendered irrational the mediating vision of ECOMOG. The failure of the Yamoussoukro meeting seems to show the seriousness of the question and brings out the full importance of Liberia in the geostrategic thinking and calculations of the subregion's leadership, unless the behavior of the various parties happens to stem in the final analysis from mere emotions toward the various leaders who have ruled in Monrovia.

Could ECOWAS be considered disqualified to handle the Liberian problem? That is possible. If that is the case, we still have one alternative forum left: the OAU. Unfortunately, the pan-African organization, which has under the pressure of the continent's economic necessity become a sort of "contraption" in settling crises, may find itself once more adding to its reputation of inefficiency. Perhaps the United States, which gave birth to Liberia last century, could bring us the "American peace." That would not be to the glory of ECOWAS.

### Niger

#### Army Contingent Leaves for Saudi Arabia

AB1511145690 Niamey Domestic Service in French  
1200 GMT 15 Nov 90

[Text] They finally left this morning. They refers to the 481 Niger soldiers charged with defending the holy land of Islam. Constituted on a voluntary basis, this operation is codenamed Operation (Zoumounchi). The ceremony organized on the occasion was graced with the august presence of the president of the republic, the prime minister, the chairman of the National Development Council [CND], and several members of government and of the diplomatic corps accredited to our country.

In his speech to mark the occasion, the chief of general staff of the Niger Armed Forces, Colonel (Toumba)

Aboubakar, said this politico-military commitment enables the Army to answer the call of history. We listen to him:

[Begin Aboubakar recording] I seize the opportunity offered by the event to stress that it is the first time that our Armed Forces finds itself invested with a laudable duty outside our borders. In this regard, I, on behalf of the entire Niger Armed Forces, pay glowing tribute to the government of our country, especially to the president of the republic and head of state for this bold decision which will go down in the annals of world history. This politico-military commitment, while honoring our country, will enable our Armed Forces to stand by the side with other international contingents, in answer to the call of history in an international crisis that addresses the conscience of humanity to ensure the restoration of peace in the face of flouted international law.

The First Niger Intervention Battalion, which will be flying to Saudi Arabia in a moment, is a battalion of 481 men comprising 21 officers, 110 noncommissioned officers, and 350 privates. This is, certainly, a token contribution considering, especially, the size of contingents already deployed by other countries. Considering the structures and means at the disposal of our Army, however, I must admit that it is a feat.

Constituted essentially on a voluntary basis, the First Niger Intervention Battalion was the subject of an in depth analysis with a view to determining its structure, composition, and the means of enabling it to perform the mission that will be entrusted to it to the best of its ability. The operation is codenamed (Zoumouchi), a term which brilliantly denotes the friendship and brotherhood that guided our country in its political decision.

Mr. President of the Republic, honorable guests, allow me at this juncture to turn to the members of the contingent. Soldiers of Operation (Zoumouchi), we know how arduous your task is, but Niger and her people entrust you with the very heavy duty of representing her with dignity abroad, by the side of brothers-in-arms of Saudi Arabia and [words indistinct]. We, therefore, ask you to behave as worthy sons of Niger by showing the world that our country, despite its modest means, is proud to occupy its place at this great historical rendezvous. We also ask you to demonstrate your high sense of discipline, cohesion, self-denial, and skill, qualities that have always characterized our Armed Forces, and which remain the cardinal components of its strength.

Finally, we ask you to proudly raise the flag that will be handed over to you in a moment, your flag, designed with the national colors in order that your glorious exploits may later be recorded in golden letters. [sentence as heard] Members of Operation (Zoumouchi), I ask you to meditate on this popular saying: Away from the eyes, near to the heart. It is this witty saying that I borrow to assure you, once more, that the entire Niger people are with you. [end recording]

## Nigeria

### Sawyer Briefs Babangida; Liberian Station Noted

AB1411223090 Lagos Domestic Service in English  
2100 GMT 14 Nov 90

[Text] The leader of the interim government in Liberia, Professor Amos Sawyer, has expressed gratitude to Nigeria for accommodating Liberian refugees. He was speaking to newsmen in Lagos today after briefing President Ibrahim Babangida on the latest situation in Liberia. Professor Sawyer, who had earlier briefed Vice President Augustus Aikhomu on the same issue, said that commercial activities were being restored in Liberia.

Meanwhile, a new radio station to serve the internal administration in that country has been commissioned by ECOMOG [Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group] field commander, Major General Joshua Dogonyaro. With this development, the interim government now has access to the people through radio, since the former station was destroyed in the war. Commissioning the new radio station, Maj. Gen. Dogonyaro said that this could not have come at a better time than now, when efforts were being made toward reconstruction, rehabilitation, and [word indistinct]. He observed that the Liberian civil war had brought hardship and sorrow to the people. A Radio Nigeria correspondent in Monrovia, Mamman Kubanje, described the establishment of the radio station as a significant step to counter the propaganda machinery of rebel leader Charles Taylor, who operates a mobile radio station.

### 'Palestinian Ambassador' Condemns U.S. in Gulf

AB1411174290 Dakar PANA in English  
1705 GMT 14 Nov 90

[Text] Lagos, 14 Nov. (NAN/PANA)—The ambassador of the state of Palestine in Nigeria, Samir Diab, Wednesday in Lagos expressed optimism in an Arab solution to the current Gulf crisis, caused by the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait on 2 August. Diab said at the monthly NAN/PANA forum that the crisis in the Gulf was between brothers in one family and the presence of foreign troops in the region would not contribute to the solution of the issue. He welcomed the Arab summit convened by King Hassan of Morocco for a solution to the crisis.

The Iraqis, he said, are more prepared to give concessions to their Arab brothers than to foreign troops led by the United States. The ambassador said there was no ambivalence in the PLO's role in the crisis. The organisation's stand, he added, was based on principle and not on any desire or expectation of financial support or backing from the parties in the crisis. Diab said that the PLO understood the interests of the Arab nations but that partiality in the dispute would not solve the problem.

Diab, who came to Nigeria in 1985, with concurrent accreditation to Benin Republic, Togo and Niger, warned of the dangers of war in the Gulf, saying everybody would suffer. The Palestinian ambassador condemned the United States for dispatching troops quickly to the Gulf to implement UN Security Council sanctions, while it failed to respond in the same way to apartheid in South Africa and Israeli-occupation of Arab lands.

On PLO-Nigeria relations, Diab expressed satisfaction with the existing cordial relations. He commended the Federal Government for the solidarity and support given to the Palestinian's right to self determination. He said that the modest Palestinian community in Nigeria was working to promote economic relations between the two states.

#### \* Six-Month Debt Service Exceeds \$4 Billion

91AF0186A Kaduna *NEW NIGERIAN* in English  
12 Oct 90 pp 1, 9

[Text] The servicing of Nigeria's debts gulped a total sum of 4,313.5 million U.S. dollars (about N34.5 [naira] billion) in the first 6 months of the outgoing fiscal year, a Central Bank report has revealed.

The report covering the period up to June this year, said that external debt alone consumed 1,784.4 million dollars.

It explained that the bulk of the increase in the debt servicing was due to payment to the Paris Club of creditors.

According to the report, the payment rose from 54.8 million dollars in the first half of 1989 to 743.3 million U.S. dollars due to the redemption of commitments under Nigeria's bilateral agreements with its members.

As to the World Bank, it said its payments increased by 53.7 percent, with that of the London Club declining by 62.1 percent as a result of relief derived from the restructuring and refinancing agreement signed with the club in March 1989.

The merchandise import payment of 1,252.8 million U.S. dollars, it noted, exceeded the level in the same period of last year by 25.7 percent. This accounted for 290.0 percent of the total outpayment.

Meanwhile, the Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Professor Adebayo Adedeji, has renewed his call for a Marshal Plan-type aid programme for Africa.

In an address at a 1-day conference on "Prospects of Africa in the 1990's" in London, the secretary noted that the need for the Marshal type of aid programme has been accentuated by the establishment of the proposed European Bank for Development and Reconstruction for Eastern Europe.

Professor Adedeji stressed that imaginative response comparable to the current response of the West to the needs of Eastern Europe which include bilateral aid packages and increased private foreign investment was required to restore growth and development in African countries.

Beside, he warned against the industrial countries support of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's insistence on the "dogged pursuit" of Structural Adjustment Programme rather than the African Alternative Programme to SAP (AAF-SAP) launched by the BCA [expansion unknown] last year.

According to Professor Adedeji all bilateral and multi-lateral donors should strive to achieve a broad consensus around the ASF-SAP, to achieve economic recovery.

#### \* Officials Waive Voting Rights in Elections

91AF0190A Kaduna *NEW NIGERIAN* in English  
16 Oct 90 pp 1, 11

[Article by Adamu Marshal and Dorothy Kave]

[Text] The president, General Ibrahim Babangida, and senior government functionaries actively involved in the transition to civil rule, will not vote during the forthcoming elections in the country, it was revealed yesterday.

Professor Jerry Gana, chairman of the Directorate of Social Mobilization (MAMSER), gave the hint in Kaduna while defending the open ballot system.

He told newsmen that the president and all those actively involved in the transition programme, would sacrifice their voting rights to ensure neutrality in the march towards democracy in the country.

He said such a sacrifice did not mean that those affected were also sacrificing their conscience, adding that it was the height of patriotism. "We will not vote if it will bring credibility to the electoral process," he added.

The chairman said the present administration did not opt for the open ballot system because it was supremely better than the secret ballot system, but that the secret ballot the country had been using since 1959, had failed many times with disastrous consequences.

Professor Gana however, called on Nigerians to support NEC [National Electoral Commission] and the open ballot system which, he described as historic and necessary decision for a democratic Nigeria.

He said for 30 years the secret ballot system had been bastardized and vandalised, resulting in disorder and confusion in the country.

He noted that the open ballot system was used during the ward election, and had proved to be successful throughout the country.



The chairman said "the open ballot system is workable and we believe that Nigerians when they want to do something, they will do it well."

Meanwhile, Professor Jerry Gana, has called on the two registered political parties—NRC [National Republican Convention] and SDP [Social Democratic Party]—to face the electorate and explain their programmes, rather than make MAMSER whipping boy.

Speaking at a press briefing in Kaduna yesterday to mark the start of a 2-day armed forces and police seminar on "social mobilisation on professional roles in the emergence of democratic process," Professor Gana said MAMSER has been absolutely just and neutral and would remain so throughout the transition programme.

He said the constitution of over 5,575 electoral wards nationwide for each of the two political parties, indicated the viability of the parties and a manifestation of the non-partisan role of MAMSER.

The chairman said the directorate's activities which resulted in the fairly equal registration of members of the two political parties further certified that "a job well done has been done by a neutral people."

He said it was unfair for any of the two parties to accuse MAMSER of taking sides in its lists for a free and fair elections through the transition to civil rule programme.

The chairman therefore, urged the political parties to focus their attention on issues-oriented political campaign rather than abuses and rancour, as was the case in the second republic.

Professor Gana, however, confirmed that the political debates sponsored and organised by MAMSER had been shelved until after consultation with the political parties.

Meanwhile, the chairman has said that the vice-president, Admiral Augustus Aikhomu (rtd) is expected to declare the seminar open at the Lugard Hall, Kaduna on Wednesday 17 October.

## Senegal

### Security Forces Arrest Opposition Leaders

AB1411200890 Paris AFP in English 1948 GMT  
14 Nov 90

[Text] Dakar, Nov 14 (AFP)—Security forces arrested several opposition leaders participating here Wednesday in a protest against the restrictive media policy of Senegal's ruling Socialist Party. Among those arrested were Abdoulaye Bathily, Secretary General of the Democratic League, Babacar Niang, secretary general of the People's Liberation Party, Majhmouth Diop, Secretary General of the African Independence Party, and Ahmadou Guiro, leader of the Socialist Workers' Organization. Also arrested were several opposition deputies, including Boubacar Sall, the deputy head of the Senegalese Democratic Party. Security forces, who were

deployed in massive numbers throughout the capital, used tear gas to disperse the demonstrators.

### \* Editorial Reaction to Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

#### \* Iraq, U.S. Condemned

91AF0148A Dakar SUD HEBDO in French  
20 Sep 90 p 7

[Article: "Islamists React"]

[Text] Senegalese Islamist movements have condemned Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, but they vehemently oppose the presence of foreign forces in the country where the principal holy places of Islam are situated. El-Hadj Cheikh Toure's Organization for Islamic Action (OAI) condemned "the annexation of Kuwait by Saddam Husayn, the presence in Hejaz [province where Mecca is located] of the armed coalition of the United States, England and France—which have once again displayed their contempt of Islam—and the Saudi dynasty's recourse to anti-Islamic forces to ensure the survival of their decadent regime."

The OAI also expressed its "astonishment at the position of the Senegalese Government, which in the last two years has been unable to resolve the bloody conflicts or stop the heavy losses in human life on our northern and southern borders."

Responding through their coordination and oversight committee, the Jamaatou Ibadour Rahmane and the Salafite Al Falah Movement for Islamic Culture denounced the numerous maneuvers of the "neo-Crusader and Zionist enemies of Islam" and condemned the invasion of Kuwait by an Iraq "overarmed by the West." But they also raised their voices against the presence of the troops in the Gulf. The two movements questioned how it was possible "to call on the enemies of Islam to defend Islamic territory." The coordination and oversight committee therefore reaffirmed "the necessity for withdrawal of foreign forces from the region" and called on "all Muslims to stand vigilant against the plots hatched by the Crusaders, the Zionists and their agents against Islam and the Muslims."

#### \* Military, Oil Groups Benefit

91AF0148B Dakar WAL FADJRI in French  
21-27 Sep 90 p 8

[Editorial by Aas Njaay: "Saddam The 'Well-Beloved'"]

[Text] Saddam Husayn must surely be wondering whether the Americans really want to see him disappear forever from the international scene...

Saddam Husayn has become the only head of state in the world whose existence is seemingly necessary to the continuation of life as we know it on this planet, i.e., the perpetuation of the struggle between good and evil. The existence of evil is an absolute necessity, not only for the powerful munitions cartels, but also for the politicians

anxious to avoid the serious problems entailed by a forced demobilization of much of the world's armies.

The defense budget, which always sailed easily through democratic parliaments when the Soviet Union represented the "evil empire," is now beginning to be subjected to critical and even dangerous scrutiny. And American manufacturers who had their hopes pinned on the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI]—Reagan's baby, which President Bush inherited—are now looking for ways to use the Iraqi crisis to keep contracts headed their way.

In the U.S. House of Representatives, Iraq was the only argument the Republican minority could bring to bear against reduction of the SDI appropriation. According to them, SDI could thwart a potential Iraqi ballistic missile attack. Given the fact that SDI will not be operational for some years yet, one wonders whether these Republicans are not secretly hoping Saddam Husayn will be in power for a long time to come. But the argument was not successful: the legislators cut back the SDI budget to \$2.3 billion, a \$2-billion reduction.

A second personality with a big stake in Saddam's longevity is James Baker. The American secretary of state recently said that American forces stationed in Saudi Arabia would remain there for years to thwart Saddam, even if the dictator withdrew from Kuwait. It took a clarification from Bush himself, in his message to the Iraqi nation broadcast on Iraqi television, to put the matter to rest. "Americans will not stay one more day than necessary," he said, if Kuwait is restored to its pre-invasion status. But Baker's remarks are still on the record.

### Provocations

Even Mike Dugan, the head of the Air Force, was relieved of his duties by Defense Secretary Dick Cheney. Politically unsophisticated, the old soldier (along with the general staff) had considered bombing Saddam and his family.

What is more, the Arabs themselves seem to like Saddam Husayn better than ever. The Saudi foreign minister, Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, even told Radio Monte Carlo in an interview that if Iraq "today demands that the Arab world back its bid to become a strong, powerful, and stable state—politically, economically, and even militarily—all the countries of the Gulf will support it, if only it agrees to withdraw from Kuwait and re-establish the legitimate regime."

These little facts and statements should be given serious thought by the militarily insignificant states involved in the Gulf operation in hopes of reaping dividends. Although Saddam Husayn may not follow through on the sometimes incomprehensible threats he sometimes makes against certain countries, he could nevertheless emerge more or less victorious from negotiations and be in a position to pay back those small countries for their impertinence during the Gulf crisis.

After more than a month of reflecting on the situation, major Arab negotiators are stirring into action. Algeria and Hassan II are not lightweights in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia itself wants dialogue but believes that no Arab country—except Libya—has presented a serious proposal. If the Union of the Arab Maghreb under Chadli Bendjedid espouses the al-Qadhdhafi plan, Saddam Husayn will be inclined to discuss it. What al-Qadhdhafi envisions is actually rather realistic: the replacement of Iraqi forces in Kuwait by UN "blue helmets" and deployment of Arab units to replace American troops in Saudi Arabia.

The al-Qadhdhafi plan could even be merged with the Saddam plan. According to 'Arafat, the Iraqi president is ready to hold discussions with Riyadh or the United Nations on withdrawal of his troops from Kuwait. On two conditions, however: that Jabir step down as emir of Kuwait in favor of one of his brothers, and that arrangements be made for an international conference on Palestine and Lebanon.

So what do we have here? The rhetoric of peace used as a rationale to perpetuate "cold-war" thinking, but in terms radically different from the East-West conflict? Those who hope to control Arab oil can remain in the region only so long as Saddam Husayn is in power. And those who want the security of an American military presence—Fahd and the other Gulf kings—can have it only if Saddam Husayn continues to play the role of "bad boy" of the Arab world.

The arms merchants, the collectors of taxes on profits from the munitions factories, the weapons makers—in short, all the merchants of death—have an interest in seeing Saddam Husayn's provocations continue, so long as they stop short of war. The Israelis must also be secretly pleased to see the Arabs neutralized by Saddam, even while they benefit from the nearby American protection in Saudi Arabia. Perhaps the emir of Kuwait can only hope that Saddam makes the mistake of crossing the Rubicon and unleashing the war which, according to the Saudi foreign minister, "would not be in the interest of any country of the region."

### \* 2,000 Volunteers

91AF0148C Dakar LE SOLEIL in French  
11 Sep 90 p 3

[Article by Moustapha Sait Diagne: "More Than 2,000 Volunteers"]

[Text] Assane Diop is crazy about volunteer work. It is all he knows. In 1975 he volunteered to carry out little jobs in the bureaucracy. Today he is ready to sacrifice himself to defend the holy places of Islam. Assane is one of 2,000 Senegalese who have volunteered to raise high the standard of Islam, to come to the aid of the Islamic countries, and to defend [international] law in the Gulf.

For several days now there has been a constant stream of visitors to the Saudi Embassy. From morning until

evening they keep the embassy staff busy enrolling them as volunteers to go fight alongside Senegalese troops in the land of Islam. For the last 10 days the embassy has been accepting volunteers, about 200 of whom arrive each day to inscribe their names and addresses on the rolls. The procedure is simple, but after volunteers are enrolled they always linger on the premises for a few moments, before going up to a security officer and asking him: "What will be done with our enrollments?" And the security official's answer is always the same: "For the moment, just wait. You may be called up through the media or individually."

What spurs these Senegalese to volunteer to go fight Saddam Husayn? Those with whom we talked said the

attack against Kuwait and the threat hanging over Saudi Arabia were frankly shocking. That is why they decided to dedicate themselves body and soul to the cause of Saudi Arabia and the Muslim countries.

For others, it is not just a question of religious faith. It seems they also want to give their lives meaning. Here they are without work, not really attached to anything they are doing. So they are ready to defend any cause that looks highminded. "Even if the Vatican were attacked that way, I would go help defend it," said one of them. It is also a good bet that many who signed up to help Saudi Arabia against Iraq have also been outraged by the events in a neighboring country.



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**DATE FILMED**

16 Nov 1990

